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ABSTRACT 
One of the surprising features of modern economic growth is that 
economies with abundant natural resources have tended to grow less 
rapidly than natural resource scarce economies.  This paper 
demonstrates that countries with high levels of natural resource 
exports tend to grow slower than those countries that have fewer 
natural resource exports.  However, when controlling for the quality of 
institutions, the effect can be reversed.  It is has been found that all 
countries (regardless of the intensity of natural resource exports) 
perform better under „good‟ institutions than under „poor‟ institutions.  
Furthermore, the study examines the determinates of good 
institutions and finds that high levels of social and human capital are 
pre-requisites for strong institutions and good governance.  The data 
therefore suggests that high stocks of human and social capital are 
possible cures to the resource curse.  The study further concludes 
that although resource abundance is linked to slower levels of 
economic growth, countries should not turn a blind eye to their natural 
resources.  They should however not depend on them too much as 
the benefits of resource based industrialisation and „forced‟ 
beneficiation are questioned.  The study has implications for policy 
makers as it recommends that a blank page approach be taken when 
formulating a development strategy.   
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In terms of institutional reform, the study examines various forms 
of government in Africa against economic success and finds that 
African countries perform better under democracies.  This finding is 
likely linked to the mode of manifestation of the resource curse.  In 
Africa, the resource curse seems to specifically manifest itself 
through the political economy (including systems of political 
patronage, conflict and security) and not through the effects of macro-
economic instability (i.e. Dutch disease).  Furthermore, a 
geographical study of institutions, human capital and economic 
performance suggests that good performance spills over into 
adjacent countries, thereby creating a case for increased 
regionalisation in Africa and recommends more bilateral trade and 
interdependency of African economies to spread good practices. 
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
It would seem strange that countries that possess large amounts 
of natural resources should not benefit from their extraction.  It should 
be to their advantage to extract these resources either for export or 
as inputs for domestic manufacturing and that rather than hampering 
economic growth and development, that a bounty of natural 
resources would be a certain advantage.  Development economists 
of the 1950s and 1960s argued that resource abundance would serve 
to fuel rapid economic growth by providing countries with the 
necessary capital to industrialise their economies and diversify their 
exports (Luong, 2003).  However in reality the opposite is more often 
the case – resource rich countries have often performed worse than 
resource poor countries at providing economic and political 
opportunities for their citizenry (Tsalik, 2003).  This phenomenon has 
been dubbed the „resource curse‟ by economists globally.  It is now 
quite common knowledge in economic circles that vast natural 
resources1 are associated with, stagnant or negative growth rates, 
(Sachs and Warner 1995) de-industrialisation and political instability 
(Smith 2004), conflict (Klare 2001) weak institutions and authoritarian 
regimes (Luong 2003). 
 
                                            
1
 One of the weaknesses of the resource curse theory is that the point at which an economy is defined 
as resource rich is poorly defined in the literature. 
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Despite some success stories, Africa is poor and getting poorer.  
There is also some emerging sentiment of pessimism regarding the 
future prospects of Africa, manifesting itself in Easterly and Levine‟s 
“African Dummy Variable” (1997, cited in Acemoglu, Johnson and 
Robinson, 2003).  Nevertheless, why is it that so few African 
countries have been able to use their rich natural resource base to 
deliver sustainable economic growth?  The case of Botswana is often 
cited as an African success story (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 
2003; Sarraf and Jiwanji, 2001) and there is almost complete 
agreement that Botswana‟s success is due to its adoption of proper 
policies and the formation of functioning institutions based upon 
relatively intact2 tribal institutions which led to the natural 
transgression into a functioning democracy.  So why are some 
countries able to escape their natural resource curse, while other 
African countries stumble?3  The answer may lie in the quality of 
these institutions, and their incorporation in an already strong base of 
social capital which allows for the proper functioning of these 
institutions. 
 
Since natural resources are neither „good‟ nor „bad‟ in 
themselves, it cannot be the presence of natural resources but must 
                                            
2
 Because of the lack of attention paid to Botswana by the British Empire, its tribal institutions were left 
relatively intact until independence. 
3
 Whether or not Botswana has escaped the resource curse remains debatable.  Botswana is heavily 
reliant upon diamond mining and the economy is facing difficulty in diversifying. 
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rather be the management of natural resources that creates an 
environment which leads to the resource curse.  In turn, the 
management of natural resources is a function of a country‟s policies, 
the structure of the state, the capacity of government and the checks 
and balances between the various institutions.  
 
 “What seems to matter for economic growth is not the 
abundance of natural resources per se, but rather it is the 
quality of their management and of economic 
management and institutions in general.” – Gylfason 
(2001a) 
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2.0 THE RESOURCE CURSE EXPLAINED 
The resource curse thesis is most notably defined by Sachs and 
Warner (1989) who presented evidence of a “statistically significant, 
inverse, and robust association between natural resource intensity4 
and [economic] growth.”  As previously mentioned, the resource 
curse postulates that countries with abundant natural resources tend 
to not benefit from these resources and in fact, they are worse off 
than if they had never developed their natural resources.  The 
literature seems to agree (with a few exceptions) that mineral rich 
countries may benefit from their mineral wealth in the short-term, 
however without the proper ability to manage these short-term gains 
and due to other politico economic ramifications of the resource 
curse, a resource rich country is „distracted‟ from its developmental 
focus and ends up in a developmental trap actually worsening the 
prospects for long-term growth.  The figure below (2-1), taken from 
Gylfason (2001a), depicts the effect of a short-term economic gain 
from a resource „boom‟, and the post-boom growth trajectory of the 
resource dependent country which results in slower economic growth 
in the long term. 
                                            
4
 The natural resources measured were not limited to minerals but also included oil and agricultural 
products.  Furthermore, the natural resource intensity was measured as the percentage of natural 
resources exported to total exports – which can be considered to be more akin to resource dependence 
than „abundance‟.  Under the definition of Sachs and Warner, countries that use natural resources 
primarily for domestic consumption such as the United States would not be termed „resource abundant‟. 
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Figure 2-1  Growth path following resource boom. (Gylfason 2001a) 
 
Much effort has been spent in recent years to understand the 
effects of the resource curse on developing nations.  Its study and 
documentation has been so robust that it has gained widespread 
acceptance and has to some degree come to be considered as fact.  
Sachs and Warner continued to build upon their 1989 and 1995 
research, and in 2001 they concluded that: 
 
 “Almost without exception, the resource-abundant 
countries have stagnated in economic growth since the 
early 1970s, inspiring the term „curse of natural 
resources‟.  Empirical studies have shown that this curse 
is a reasonably solid fact.” [emphasis added] – Sachs 
and Warner 2001. 
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As the theorem has become elevated in economic circles, 
researchers have now also begun examining the mechanisms 
through which the resource curse manifests itself.  The following 
subsections seek to explain how natural resource 
intensity/dependency can impede economic growth in the long run 
and result in the „curse of natural resources.‟  
 
2.1 Dutch disease 
A combination of pressures including exchange rate appreciation, 
inflationary pressure, skills shortages and government subsidies 
combine into what is commonly termed “Dutch disease.”  Although 
the term is “Dutch disease”, the symptoms are not actually limited to 
the Netherlands.  The “Dutch disease” received its name after the 
discovery of natural gas in the Netherlands in the late 1950s and 
early 1960s causing a number of unexpected negative economic 
consequences for the Netherlands.  Due to the discovery of natural 
gas, exports increased significantly and as a result the exchange rate 
correspondingly appreciated in value.  Following the resource boom 
and the appreciation of the exchange rate, the Netherlands 
experienced inflationary pressures, the migration of skills between 
sectors (thus causing skills shortages in non-boom sectors) and 
government subsidies to ailing sectors as the government tried to 
prevent or postpone de-industrialisation due to an uncompetitive non-
boom tradables sector.  Although many of the negative economic 
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side-effects of Dutch disease are due to an appreciation of the 
exchange rate, Dutch disease can also occur in countries which lack 
their own currencies, such as Greenland which uses the Danish 
Krone or in Namibia whose currency is linked to the South African 
Rand (Gylfason 2001a).   
 
The discovery of large new resources or commodity cycle 
„booms‟, can often lead to a significant increase in the value of a 
country‟s exports.  This increase in exports can in turn lead to a 
balance of trade problem, which in turn will increase the real value of 
a country‟s exchange rate.  In the case of commodity cycle booms, 
the volatility associated with the commodity prices can translate into 
exchange rate volatility in resource dependant states.  This in turn 
can have the negative consequence of impeding a nation‟s ability to 
attract investment due to greater perceptions of financial instability 
thereby increasing risks. 
 
Another problem caused by the appreciation of the exchange rate 
is that those goods that have not experienced a boom (non-boom 
tradable goods) will also increase in price, thus reducing the 
competitiveness of other exports globally.  Many studies have 
illustrated the lack of competitiveness of countries‟ manufacturing 
sectors as a result of a resource boom (Gylfason 2001a, Robinson 
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Torvik and Verdier 2002, Larsen 2003).  Thus, abnormal increases in 
the exchange rate can lead to gradual de-industrialisation as the non-
boom tradables sector becomes increasingly uncompetitive. 
 
In addition to pricing pressures due to exchange rate volatility, 
pressure is placed on the manufacturing sector through the 
displacement of workers due to wage imbalances.  Whereas the 
manufacturing sector may need to freeze or reduce wages due to the 
reduction in the profit margins as they strive to reduce costs in order 
to remain globally competitive, the boom sectors will be offering 
premium wages as they strive to attract staff for the boom induced 
expansions.  This differential in wages draws skilled workers away 
from the manufacturing sector, which in turn reduces the overall 
productivity of the manufacturing sector (Gylfason 2001a).  
 
As the manufacturing sector begins to show signs of trouble, it is 
not uncommon for governments to begin subsidising these ailing, 
globally uncompetitive enterprises by redistributing the rents 
generated through the „boom‟ sector.  However, in general the 
amount of subsidies required due to the downswing of the 
manufactured goods sector are too great to come from the boom 
sector alone (Sarraf and Jiwanji, 2001), thus it would appear that a 
strategy to subsidise can only be short-term.  Rather than becoming a 
sustainable solution, it can be used to temporarily slow the effects of 
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Dutch disease, or it may be used to wait out the „boom‟ in hopes that 
the exchange rate will return to pre-boom levels, thus reviving the 
competitiveness of the manufacturing sector. 
 
2.2 Protectionist state policies 
As governments try to save their ailing manufacturing sectors, 
these subsidies can further evolve into protectionist state policies.  
“This inward looking development results in lower investments 
rates,…  [further reducing] growth rates” (Sachs and Warner, 1995).  
An export led development strategy may then be forced to convert 
into an import-substitution development strategy; else a country could 
face de-industrialisation and become a principal producer of primary 
exports.  Accompanying the new shift in policies will be import tariffs 
since, with a strengthening currency it will be relatively cheaper to 
import products (Gylfason, 2001a).  Thus to make locally 
manufactured products more competitive, subsidies will usually be 
accompanied by some sort of pricing or trade distortions.  
 
2.3 Linkages 
A further area where a reduction of the manufacturing sector in 
favour of primary industries can negatively affect growth is through 
the difference in backward and forward linkages generally present in 
each sector.  There is evidence to support that the manufacturing 
sector creates many more backward and forward linkages than the 
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primary sector.  The primary sector is generally seen as an enclave 
sector which, being very capital intensive (as in the extractive 
industries) would normally seek to import most of its goods and 
equipment since the equipment required is usually very specialised 
and produced by few manufactures globally.  Sachs and Warner 
(1995), summarise that “manufacturing, as opposed to natural-
resource production, leads to a more complex division of labour and 
hence to a higher standard of living.”  Complementing the argument 
that there are additional benefits to manufacturing over natural 
resources, Matsuyama (1992, cited in Sachs and Warner, 1995) 
found that: 
 
 “…forces that push the economy away from 
manufacturing and towards agriculture lower the growth 
rate of the economy, by reducing the learning-induced 
growth of manufacturing.  The market equilibrium is not 
efficient because the learning effects are external to the 
firm.  In this context Matsuyama shows that trade 
liberalisation in a land-intensive economy could actually 
slow economic growth by inducing the economy to shift 
resources away from manufacturing and towards 
agriculture.” –Sachs and Warner, (1995), pg. 5. 
 
  
Gylfason (2001a) further builds on the linkages of manufacturing, 
stating that manufacturing is often associated as being a major 
contributor to educational progress as it is the „learning-by-doing‟ 
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sector.  By calling it the “learning by exporting” sector, Gylfason 
further emphasises that a manufacturing sector that is subsidised and 
not competing globally is in fact not learning.  Gylfason goes as far as 
to say that “trade is education”. [emphasis added] 
 
There are however ways of escaping the Dutch disease and the 
resource curse if institutions and institutional capacity are adequate 
(as will be expanded upon later in this paper.)  Often, in a sudden 
boom-induced type of economic shock a country may not have much 
experience with natural resource policy-making5, and it may not have 
the capacity or foresight to create a set of national policies to 
stimulate linkages.  Some recent examples of the type of policies that 
can be used to stimulate linkages can be found in South Africa‟s new 
mineral legislation.  The new legislation requires not only local 
content obligations (in terms of both equity ownership and 
procurement) in the hands of historically disadvantaged South 
Africans which will serve to address inequality, but it also includes a 
set of draft local beneficiation legislation which has recently been 
released in 2005.  
 
                                            
5
 As was the case in the Netherlands, whereby before the discovery of natural gas, the Netherlands did 
not have robust policies to cater for the macroeconomic consequences of being exposed to commodity 
cycles. 
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Different commodities will however create different degrees of 
linkages in the host economy.  For example, the labour intensive 
agricultural sector may not use much equipment, fertilizers or other 
manufactured goods, however the widespread effect on employment 
can have a significant effect on stimulating consumption and reducing 
poverty & vulnerability.  The energy sector can also have varying 
degrees of linkages.  Where energy is exported in the form of crude 
oil, not many linkages are formed since most of the equipment is 
imported and the wells tend to use specialised foreign labour 
amounting to fewer opportunities for domestic labour.  In the case of 
coal mining for energy requirements, the coal deposits will normally 
be locked into long-term contracts with a local energy company thus 
the linkages created would not only be limited to the mine‟s direct 
consumption but could also be extended to include those formed by 
the energy company.  There are varying degrees of linkages within 
the mining sector alone.  A first distinction can be made between 
open pit and underground mining operations.  A second distinction 
can be made within the mining sector based on the type of 
commodity.  Precious metals and gemstone operations normally 
produce fewer linkages than base metals operations due to the 
concentrated and highly valuable nature of the final product.  This is 
principally due to the fact that gold, platinum, diamonds and other 
gemstones can be concentrated very quickly to a point where the 
costs of further mineral purification exceed the cost of transportation.  
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In this case, a natural resource extraction company may choose to 
export a „rough‟ product and do further refining in a centralised 
location (possibly in a neighbouring country.)  In the case of base 
metals, a large degree of purification is required before the metal can 
be concentrated to a suitable level which renders it economical for 
export.  This is generally due to the low value of the metal on a $/lb 
basis which requires that only a final product be exported.  It is of 
interest to note that often in lesser developed countries, the bulk of 
the minerals produced tend to be precious metals and gemstones.  
This is most likely due to the long-term investment risk associated 
with large smelting and refining operations in politically unstable 
developing economies.  Thus it would seem that lowering perceptions 
of risk is one way to stimulate the minerals industry and export 
diversification (to a limited degree) through the development of other 
more capital intensive ventures. 
 
Perala (2003, cited in Korhonen 2004) who deepened the 
analysis of the resource curse to also examine the effect of individual 
types of natural resources, concluded that countries which 
predominantly export fuel and minerals termed “point source 
economies” are more likely to grow slowly than countries which 
export a variety of raw materials termed “diffuse economies.”  This 
could be due to the fact that since individual commodity prices follow 
cycles that are not necessarily synchronised, resource booms are 
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therefore not synchronized and economies that rely on a „portfolio‟ of 
minerals rather than just a few are spreading their risks.    This 
strategy would be endorsed by Wright and Czelusta (2003) who state 
that: 
 
 “Excessive reliance on a single commodity for export 
earnings is unwise, especially if the market in question is 
volatile and if it provides the major source of government 
revenues…. In such a situation, adverse shocks are 
extremely stressful for any society, and in the case of 
Venezuela, it may have been more than the society could 
withstand (perhaps exposing underlying weaknesses in 
its political institutions).” - Wright and Czelusta (2003) 
 
 
It may be fair to say that extractive industries create lesser 
linkages in developing countries, however in developed countries 
where a broader spectrum of extractive industries exist, the sector 
can produce equally significant linkages as manufacturing, provided 
that the right investment climate exists for private enterprises to 
invest the necessary capital in order to beneficiate their products. 
 
In stimulating linkages, there is a need for a regional approach to 
promoting policies which encourage the beneficiation of minerals in 
African countries.   As is probably typical of most African countries, 
Tanzania‟s borders are poorly controlled, allowing for goods to be 
moved between neighbouring countries with very little risk of being 
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caught and with “unfenced mines, [as in many artisinal mining 
sectors] it [is] clearly impossible to control smuggling by enforcement 
alone.” (Wangwe, Semboja and Phillips, 2004)    When formulating 
mineral legislation that would have allowed Tanzania to extract tax 
and royalty revenues from its gem and precious metal mines, 
Tanzania needed to take cognisance of its neighbours‟ policies.  It 
became clear that gold and the gem trade were funnelling into 
Nairobi, Kenya through Tanzania‟s northern border.  The incentives 
to smuggle came from two principal sources.   First, though Nairobi 
dealers did not offer higher prices for commodities, they paid cash on 
the spot for gemstones and they would buy all qualities. Secondly, no 
transaction taxes were levied on precious-mineral imports to, or 
exports from Kenya, only a corporate tax was charged on annual 
revenues.  Thus, the trade-offs became clear for the Tanzanian 
government – either it would need to engage the Kenyan government 
to also increase the burden of taxes facing commodity dealers, better 
patrol the Tanzanian border (which would come at a cost) or offer 
incentives to local miners at the cost of losing tax revenues. 
 
The Tanzanian example demonstrates the need for regional 
cooperation when it comes to the natural resource trade.  Because 
natural resources can be a concentrated source of wealth, it is 
relatively easy for smugglers to escape the nets of government.  This 
is especially true in the case of diamonds and other gemstones.  
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There is a clear need for regional and resource specific institutions to 
enforce and promote the proper management of natural resources.  
Two of such institutions that will be discussed in greater detail later in 
this paper are the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme and the 
New Partnership for Africa‟s Development. 
 
2.4 Booms and busts of natural resource cycles 
It is quite well known that commodities follow cycles of supply 
and demand.  As China has recently demonstrated, a fast growing 
nation can raise the demand and hence the price for commodities 
significantly.  It is however not only the economic growth of nations 
that can increase the price of commodities, but there is a whole host 
of variables that must enter the supply demand equation.  For 
example, the new American legislation requiring the installation of 
catalytic converters in all new vehicles sent the price of platinum6 
soaring in 2002.  Hurricanes and other natural disasters can cause 
investor speculation regarding the disruption of supply and push up 
prices, as was the case with oil during the 2005 hurricane season.  
Catastrophic events in large mines such as a pit-wall failure that block 
access to the ore body can also raise the price of a commodity for the 
short-term as analysts revise the supply-demand imbalances.  
Conversely, price reductions can be the result of opening a large 
                                            
6
 Platinum is one of the key minerals required for the manufacturing of catalytic converters. 
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mining operation which will alter global supply for the long term as 
was the case of BHP Billiton‟s Escondida mining operation in Chile.  
Price reductions may also be due to the dumping of large stocks of 
reserves on the market as the Russians did with uranium from their 
arms dismantlement programme, or with gold as was the case with 
the world‟s banks which dumped some of their gold reserves in the 
early 1990s.  All of these variables can result in temporary short to 
medium-term shocks to commodity prices which will tend to stabilise 
in the long term.  Long term price „reductions‟ on the other hand are 
usually possible in one of three manners.   
 
Commodity replacement:  This is where a particular commodity 
becomes redundant or unnecessary due to the advent of other 
technologies.  This may either lead to substitution or simply a 
reduced demand of the raw material due to innovations in recycling. 
 
Technological innovation: such as the Bessemer metallurgical 
process for copper, allowing for the introduction of electrolysis on a 
commercial scale (Wright and Czelusta, 2003).  This type of price 
reduction can have significant effects on the supply side of the 
supply/demand equation as it may convert large amounts of 
previously uneconomic resources into economic reserves (as was the 
case in Chile with regards to copper reserves during the 1880s and 
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1890s).  Further technological advances are plenty, such as the 
advent of dynamite by Nobel, the invention of the froth floatation 
recovery process, and most recently the advent of larger surface 
mining equipment (currently limited by tyre technology).  
 
Reserve discovery:  The sudden unanticipated discovery of large 
reserves can re-adjust supply predictions and lead to a reduction in 
the commodity price. 
 
All of these activities acting independently can cause significant 
volatility to commodity prices.  As can be seen below (figure 2-2), the 
nominal price per pound of copper between the period of 1980 to 
2000, varied between +50% to -40% from its mean price of 
approximately 1 USD / lb.   
 
Figure 2-2 Copper price vs. stocks (Mills, 2002) 
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The following chart (figure 2-3) shows the long-term historical 
price volatility for all commodities in the United States over a 200 year 
period.  As can be seen from the chart below, major international 
incidents can also have significant long term effects on the supply-
demand equation for minerals. 
 
 
Figure 2-3 Long-term U.S. commodity price index (Goodyear, 2005) 
 
Such volatility not only affects the exchange rate in resource 
dependant7 countries, but it also affects the planning capability of 
host nations.  The booms and busts generate times of great surplus 
and times of revenue “drought”.  Of concern to many economists is 
                                            
7
 Synonymous to a country heavily reliant upon resource exports for balance of trade. 
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that in times of commodity cycle booms, there is often a tendency by 
governments to spend the additional rents as they try to balance 
political pressures and meet certain development objectives.  Sarraf 
and Jiwanji (2001) argue that it is the after-effect of the resource 
booms which creates the conditions leading to slow-growth in the 
post-boom periods.  For example, they refer specifically to the 
“irreversibility of government expenditure” - where subsidies existed 
for ailing industries, or where there was pressure by political interests 
to increase government expenditure during the boom periods.  This 
spending is no longer possible with the reduction in revenues 
experienced once prices return to their previous state.  It can be 
extremely difficult for many governments to make cut-backs in 
spending whilst retaining political support, especially if the spending 
was in the form of fuel and food subsidies for lower income groups. 
 
In addition to spending and subsidy increases, due to resource 
booms governments also find it much easier to secure large foreign 
loans.  Governments (and creditors alike) mistakenly assume that 
commodity prices will remain at their elevated levels for long periods 
of time and take advantage of their nation‟s future positive outlook.  
Once prices finally stabilise or revert, governments are left to service 
their debts with the now reduced sources of income.  This additional 
pressure can create a situation of political regime instability as the 
broader population becomes fully aware of the financial strain that the 
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nation finds itself in.  Since financial strength is one of the ways in 
which the state seeks to legitimise itself, post-boom crises can have a 
de-legitimising effect on governments. 
 
2.5 Corruption & rent seeking 
As it is difficult for some governments to remove the subsidies 
and protection afforded during the boom periods8, governments may 
be tempted to extract more revenue from other sectors in order to 
maintain political support.  Such temptation may be directed at the 
natural resource sector in the form of taxes and royalties.  Due to the 
fixed geographic nature of natural resources, resource extraction 
companies lose much bargaining power with governments once the 
investment has been sunk.  As such, they have very little alternative 
but to comply with the increase in levies.   Bates (1994, cited in Sarraf 
and Jiwanji, 2001) argues that “the traditional functions of the state, in 
light of a resource boom, give way to the redistribution of revenues.”  
Resource abundant economies are further susceptible to rent-
seeking since the concentration of wealth in either the private or 
public sector is concentrated in such a small number of players.  
Such high concentration of wealth is often present, that in some 
instances, resource rents distract government attention away from 
long-term economic development goals towards rent-seeking (Smith 
                                            
8
 In Brazil for example, powerful groups blocked the removal of subsidies and protection afforded to the 
urban-industrial areas long after they were uncompetitive (Auty 1995, cited in Sarraf and Jiwanji 2001). 
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2004). To governments this may be justifiable, especially if they are 
adopting the „dependency theory‟ of economics.  Under such a world 
view, they would see the developed world‟s extraction of local 
resources as a form of neo-colonialism, an infraction of national 
sovereignty and another method used by the developed world to 
extract the most out of the developing world without a genuine 
contribution to economic development.   
 
The tendency to rent-seek can be one of the causal mechanisms 
behind the resource curse.  Since long-term development objectives 
require a „sustained effort‟ to come to fruition, a temporary set-back or 
change of focus (a distraction to rent-seek) could mean that to re-
adopt a development strategy may result in having to start at the 
beginning due to a loss of credibility, focus and momentum.  
 
Referring once again to the instance of Dutch disease, as 
countries try to prop up their ailing manufacturing and other non-
boom tradable sectors (rendered uncompetitive due to the 
appreciation of the exchange rate), it is not uncommon for 
governments to grant specialised loans to „entrepreneurs‟ to boost 
the diversification of the broader economy and create employment.  
In the developing world the loans are all too often awarded on the 
basis of political patronage and effectively prop up uneconomic 
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enterprises (Tsalik, 2003).  Governments become reluctant to shut 
down these enterprises, (which guarantee political support by 
providing employment) since the withdrawal of the subsidy could lead 
to a withdrawal of political support.  According to Tsalik, this cycle of 
indebtedness, inefficiency and misdirected incentives inevitably leads 
to corruption, drives up the cost of doing business for outsiders or 
those who are not part of the political elite and cannot take part in the 
subsidy system, forces businesses into the informal economy, and 
diverts capital away from viable business ventures which would thrive 
in an open and competitive economy. 
 
Furthermore as government revenues increase dramatically and 
the resource sector in general experiences a boom, government 
officials may find it increasing difficult to avoid engaging in other 
corrupt activities.  Such activities usually include the direct and 
blatant siphoning of minerals revenue meant for the State, or the 
granting of major resource development contracts to local political 
elite to secure support, political patronage or self-enrichment. 
 
Corruption and rent-seeking can hinder an economy in a number 
of various manners.  Despite the fact that corruption hampers the 
attraction of foreign investment necessary for economic development, 
corruption underutilises already scarce resources as they are 
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removed from economic utility and serve to the benefit of a few 
political elite.  Furthermore, high levels of corruption are a sign of 
poor institutional quality, a disregard for the rule of law and the poor 
enforcement of property rights – all of which are paramount to 
successful economic development as will be explored later in this 
paper. 
 
2.6 The political economy of the resource curse 
A review of the resource curse remains inadequate without 
properly exploring the politico economic dimension of the resource 
curse.  As the political economy is defined as the interrelationships 
between political and economic processes, a wealth of natural capital 
will only map out into a positive economic trajectory if a 
complimentary set of the incentives and constraints are imposed 
upon politicians.  
 
For example, if one considers a corrupt and unstable state, the 
various politicians or (people who hold power9) will have already 
embedded a system of incentives which keeps the various factions at 
peace, ensures stability and in the end their control over the state 
through the dispensation of political patronage.  Generally, patronage 
                                            
9
 This distinction is made since in many corrupt states it is not necessarily the politicians who hold 
power. 
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is defined as the act of supporting or favouring some person, group, 
or institution.  Such a system has different characteristics depending 
on the area in which it is practiced.  Generally it can be described as 
a system where someone in a powerful position offers handouts in 
return for support.  Political leaders often have at their disposal a 
great deal of patronage, in the sense that they take decisions on the 
appointment of officials inside and outside government (for example 
on quangos10).  Patronage is therefore a recognised and legitimate 
power of the executive branch.  In most countries, the executive 
branch has the right to make many appointments, some of which may 
be lucrative, while other appointments may be sinecure.  In some 
countries, high level appointments may be reviewed by the 
legislature; in other countries, such as those using the Westminster 
system11, this is not the case.  
 
In politics, patronage more narrowly defined, is the practice by 
holders of political office of appointing their followers or fellow party 
members to positions.  For example, those could be high-level posts 
such as ambassadorships, or lower-level civil service posts.  Even 
blue-collar jobs on the government payroll may be sought after.  Such 
                                            
10
 The term quasi-autonomous non-governmental organisation (QUANGO) came into common usage in 
the United Kingdom to describe the agencies produced by the growing trend of government devolving 
power to appointed or self-appointed bodies. 
 
11
 In a Westminster system, the members of parliament are elected by popular vote. The head of 
government is usually chosen by being invited to form a government, by the head of state or the 
representative of the head of state, not by parliamentary vote.  
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overt political patronage is seen as a tool for rewarding and enforcing 
loyalty.  Where loyalty is the criterion for selecting a person rather 
than more meritocratic considerations, then the selection process, if 
not the competence of the person or the quality of the bureaucracy is 
naturally seen as questionable.  
 
Patronage can consequently be seen as one of the possible 
major deficiencies of a system of excess bureaucracy, defined as a 
system with a weak bureaucratic structure, the availability of large 
public resources to the Patron, and that these public resources be 
easily divisible in order to target specific groups and individuals. 
 
Many of the institutional reforms required for economic 
development will temporarily disrupt this existing system of 
patronage12.  In turn, the leader will need to risk losing power before 
any such implementation of new policies and institutions can take 
place.  In many cases the decision to adopt a new system of 
government is somewhat related to conventional supply-demand 
economics and the threat of substitution.  As with consumers of 
goods, the consumer will only substitute one good for another once 
the incentives to do so are in place, i.e. it is less costly to use the 
substitute than is it to purchase the original product.  As with the 
                                            
12
 This may take place through increased meritocracy or requirements for increase fiscal transparency. 
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politico-economic dimension, it is only once the benefits to changing 
the current system far outweigh the costs of retaining the current 
system will leaders of under-developed resource-rich countries be 
incentivised to embark upon a strategy of structural reform13.   
 
In resource-poor economies, the adoption of the „right‟ institutions 
and the avoidance of the „political patronage trap‟ appears to be the 
more natural course.  Since, in resource poor countries no great 
wealth or patrimony naturally exists, there are little financial resources 
to entice various political actors.  In resource poor countries, one 
cannot exploit natural resources to generate the capital flows for a 
system of corrupt political patronage.  Leaders must embark upon a 
strategy to first create the wealth.  Whereas in resource rich 
countries, as has been demonstrated through various African civil 
conflicts, control of the state is often determined by those elites who 
control the natural resources. 
 
It is for these reasons that the complexity of the political economy 
and overcoming the current system of political patronage is seen as 
one of the major hurdles to implementing institutional reform in 
resource rich developing economies.  As this paper will discuss in 
                                            
13
 This is one of the principal reasons why the West has tended to link economic aid to measures of 
economic and structural reform. 
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greater detail, getting around the political economy will be one of the 
various steps necessary to getting around the resource curse. 
 
2.7 Caveats to the resource curse thesis 
Having now expanded upon the resource curse theory and given 
some of the supporting causalities for the symptoms of the curse, 
should governments of developing countries now cancel all contracts 
and turn a blind eye to their natural resources?  Since the evidence 
appears to be strong in favour for non-resource based economies, 
would not ignoring a country‟s natural resources be a first step in a 
development strategy?   
 
There are a few caveats with the resource curse literature which 
one must first expand upon before completely accepting the thesis.  
The first point is that in most of the literature, resource abundance is 
defined as the percentage value of natural resources exported to the 
value of total exports.  It is not based on the value of a nations‟ 
primary resource production to total domestic production, nor is it 
based on the quantity of natural resource reserves available for 
development.  For example, if a first world nation is a global leader in 
natural resource production (as in the case of the United States) and 
uses these resources as inputs for domestic manufacturing, the 
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nation would be termed to be poor in natural resources, and thus 
support the regressions of Sachs and Warner.  
 
Furthermore, most of the literature fails to read deeper into the 
causal mechanisms between economic stagnation and proportionality 
of natural resource exports to total exports.  It may not be necessarily 
that the presence of natural resources has caused the nation to 
stagnate, but rather that it is the failure of the nation to provide the 
„right‟ type of investment climate which has resulted in the failure of 
the economy‟s diversification.  Slightly re-phrased, the measure of 
resource abundance (as defined by the literature) may be indicative 
of a competitive advantage in natural resources in terms of 
international markets, but as Wright and Czelusta (2003) rightly point 
out, dominance of an economy toward natural resource exports may 
simply reflect an absence of other internationally competitive sectors 
– or “under-development.”  This is not such a strange empirical 
development since the presence of natural resources where no other 
economy exists is likely due to the large rents associated with natural 
resources, provided that a firm that has a high appetite for risk. 
 
Maloney (2002) and Stijns (2003) (cited in Wright and Czelusta, 
2003) demonstrate that the statistical significance of the resource 
curse deteriorates once measures such as reserves per capita and 
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the level of natural resource exports per worker are used.  Other 
insightful work carried out by Robinson, Torvik and Verdier (2002) 
using the data of Sachs and Warner (1995) shows that when 
controlling for the interaction between institutions and resources 
(measured as % commodity exports in GDP), resources can have a 
positive effect on economic growth when institutions are „good‟ and 
negative impact when institutions are „bad‟. 
  
Further work should be done using other measures to show how 
a wealth of natural resources can contribute to economic growth in 
terms of self-sufficiency and meeting a nation‟s energy requirements 
for growth14.  This work could also assist to pin point exactly what it is 
that makes countries rely heavily upon natural resources as their sole 
source of growth. 
 
In the subsequent sections, this paper will discuss how 
institutions or the lack thereof contributes to a nation‟s reliance on 
natural resource exports, as well as how poor institutional capacity 
based on maladjusted social capital stock and low levels of human 
capital detracts from the benefits arising from natural resource 
extraction in developing countries. 
                                            
14
 A certain level of natural resource production capability is essential to national security issues.  As in 
the case of World War II, had the United States been reliant on international trade for procurement of 
natural resources, it would not have been able to mobilise the American economy towards the war effort. 
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3.0 AN INSTITUTIONAL CURE? 
“The overall impact of resource booms on the economy depends 
critically on institutions, since these determine the extent to which 
political incentives map into policy outcomes.” – Robinson, Torvik and 
Verdier, 2002. 
 
The resource curse, most notably studied by Sachs and Warner 
(1995), linked resource abundance to poor economic growth and 
weak to negative economic development.  Poor economic 
development is in turn linked to increased rent-seeking and 
corruption, to closed and protectionist economies, poor quality of life, 
political instability and high levels of national indebtedness.  All of this 
translates into a poor investment climate where investment is 
relatively difficult to attract and only the most profitable ventures are 
developed and dividends expatriated resulting in low savings.   
 
One way to catalyse development through the use of the 
revenues generated by natural resources is to ensure that the funds 
are directed to the „right places.‟  To ensure that this happens, a 
country needs the „right balance‟ of institutions that have the 
„adequate capacity‟ to undertake the challenges of the developmental 
state. 
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In reality, the problem is much more complex than mere 
institutions can tackle in themselves.  Some will recommend that 
more institutions be established to fix the problems with the first set of 
institutions; however institutions can only be a cure to a certain 
extent.  There will be a point where additional institutional 
arrangements will only increase the bureaucratic red-tape and drive 
away investment rather than attract it.   Institutional complexity goes 
even further when explored.  An economy is a system of 
interdependent institutions with the government and the private sector 
inextricably intertwined.  Economic systems combine legal and 
financial bodies, formal and informal rules, common values and 
traditional modes of behaviour.   The following definition of institutions 
is taken from Douglass North's 1993 Nobel Prize Lecture: 
 
"Institutions are the humanly devised constraints that structure 
human interaction. They are made up of formal constraints (rules, 
laws, constitutions), informal constraints (norms of behaviour, 
conventions, and self imposed codes of conduct), and their 
enforcement characteristics. Together they define the incentive 
structure of societies and specifically economies." 
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Certainly the institutions adopted by a society are a 
representation of its cultural and societal fabric15.  They are a 
mechanism which is superimposed onto a society‟s values which 
allows the governance of the society to function in a way which is 
acceptable to the society to which the institutions serve.  For 
example, the political system of democracy has evolved in the West 
over a period of two thousand years since its inception in Ancient 
Greece (Athens, 5AD) and was based from philosophical arguments 
first posed by Socrates.  Over this time, the modern system of 
democracy has been refined to a great degree; the principals of 
Socratic thought have been reworked into various political (and 
institutional) forms.  However, over this period the basic fundamental 
arguments have remained mostly intact and become part of Western 
cultural norms16 and thus form a fundamental part of the stock of 
Western social capital.   
 
In turn, Confucian ideologies deeply affected East Aisa for many 
centuries dating back to 500 B.C.  The principles of Confucianism are 
embedded through emphasis on personal and governmental morality, 
correctness of social relationships, justice and sincerity.  These in 
turn gained prominence in China where Confucianism became 
adopted as the imperial orthodoxy.  Toward this end, study of the 
                                            
15
 This in turn, is a function of its human capital base as will be discussed later in this paper. 
16
 Such cultural norms refer to freedom of choice/opinion and critical thinking.  
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Confucian classics became the basis of the government examination 
system, and the core of the educational curriculum. With 
Confucianism firmly ensconced in the minds of the Chinese people 
and their politicians, it gained political primacy, and no serious 
attempt to replace it came until the advent of communism in the 20th 
century.  After its eventual reformulation as neo-Confucianism by Zhu 
Xi (1120 AD), Confucianism also became accepted as state 
philosophies in Korea and eventually spread to Japan, Singapore, 
Taiwan, and Vietnam. 
 
A preliminary evaluation of Confucianist principles reveals 
contradictory ideologies to the recent policies of the Chinese 
communist state, especially when considering that Confucius 
encouraged outward thinking and learning from the outside world.  
However one must look rather at the long term when determining 
what the social fabric of a nation consists of.  When considering that 
Confucianism was so deeply embedded into the societal fabric of 
east Asia for over 2000 years, it can be said that it acted as the „glue‟ 
in the matrix which helped China transform from the Han Dynasty 
over to communism in the early 20th century.  Recently however, the 
world has witnessed China‟s emergence from pure „closed‟ 
communism into the global economy.  So it follows that a social 
construct based from Confucianism is enabling China to successfully 
transition from communism into a more outward oriented state. 
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The importance of the previous two examples is merely to 
explore diverging institutional paths and their roots in some form of 
social capital stock.  The political systems themselves are not the 
foundations of modes of behaviour and cultural norms, but it is rather 
how those culturally accept ideals, over many years, eventually 
formed the foundations for the current state of global politics and 
economics17.  The question however remains, what of states which 
are wishing to develop quickly and are „importing‟ their institutions 
instead of rooting them deeply in their social capital? 
 
Reviewing the opening statement at the beginning of this section 
yields a couple of insights when applied to modern politics, especially 
in the developing world: Institutions are a mechanism which are 
superimposed onto a society‟s values which allows the governance of 
the society to function in a way which is acceptable to the society to 
which the institutions serve. 
 
1. The first assumption the statement makes is that societies 
in developing countries have a choice regarding the type 
of institutions it adopts.  This may be true at a certain level, 
however in general it is only in determining the shape of 
                                            
17
 Hence they also form the foundations for the institutions which govern their functionality. 
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the lowest tier of institutions where a country may have a 
free choice.  To a certain degree, countries need to 
appease their rich northern neighbours in order to qualify 
for foreign aid and donor assistance.18 This is certainly true 
in many African countries where the form of leadership, 
governance and institutions are very much dictated on 
financial terms19.  In general, African (and other aid 
recipient countries) will function as representative 
democracies, they will abide by the rules of the WTO and 
they will strive to be liberal market economies. Whereas 
Asian economies were able to develop according to a slow 
transition from Confucianism, Western countries followed 
the teachings of Socrates while for example, African 
countries are being asked to quickly develop in ways 
which don‟t necessarily touch the social capital stock of 
Africans.  
 
To this end, there is a growing realisation that the focus of the 
international community has been somewhat misplaced and that 
donor aid should nurture structural adjustments aimed at the 
                                            
18
 Much of which carries institutional reform as a condition. 
19
 The Washington Consensus, which drafted 10 key points aimed at reforming high level institutions 
supports this statement.  Signatory status to the consensus was then used to prioritise efforts and direct 
aid by the Western World and multilaterals such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. 
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developmental state – a compromise between neo-liberalism and 
overreaching state regulation (Stein, 2003).  
 
2. The second assumption the statement makes is that 
institutions are set up to assist the state to serve society.  
The verification of this assumption is fraught with 
complexity since in many African governments the 
institutions are set up to only serve a few elites while the 
majority of the population remain in poverty without a 
voice.  As is discussed later in this research report, it is not 
simply enough to have the right type of institutions in 
place, but economic growth and development is very much 
dependant on the quality of the institutions.     
 
Quality and performance of institutions is in turn predominantly 
linked to accountability (World Bank, 2004) and inevitably to voice. 
The most accountable form of government known to us today is 
democracy.  Therefore, to propose an institutional cure for the 
resource curse would require an analysis of the political disposition 
and the relative familiarity of a nation‟s populace to this type of 
political representation.  This is however in turn linked to the degree 
and quality of human and social capital which enables the proper 
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checks and balances on power and dictates the quality of 
participation by the populace. 
 
Although institutional reforms which are better aligned to human 
and social capital stocks are required on a large scale and in the 
medium to long term, an institutional arrangement is required for the 
short term in order to enable a transition into the longer term. 20  
These institutions should find their place in the social capital of the 
nation and attempt to bridge the gap between the current state and 
where the nation is aiming.   
 
The remainder of this literature review will focus on the various 
types of high level institutions and then examine some forms at which 
these are enshrined in governance mechanisms which have been 
demonstrated to assist in the management and transformation of 
nations from resource based economies. 
 
3.1 The social capital paradigm and institutional outcomes 
Even when institutions are „imported‟ from western models, they 
will only function in a manner which is compatible with the society‟s 
culture.  Therefore, if the cultural background of most of the society is 
                                            
20
 An alternative is to educate the majority of the rural African population as to the mechanisms of 
democracy and the institutions associated with it.  However, due to the magnitude of the human capital 
challenges of many African countries, it is believed that better results would be achieved in the short to 
medium term through the customisation of institutions to suit Africa‟s development path. 
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in the form of tribal or patriarchal leadership (as is the case in most of 
rural Africa), then even though democracy may be the „official‟ form of 
national leadership, patrimonialism or “neo-patrimonialism” as defined 
by Bratton and van der Walle (1997) is what will prevail as it is what 
the society is accustomed to and it will „click‟ into the psyche of 
individuals as being a natural fit to their customs. 
 
A new economic network of economic institutions is required to 
be formally in place in order to support economic growth and 
development must be based on a complementary framework of moral 
values, social traditions and political institutions (Stein, 2003). 
 
The conflict between societal norms and political ideology may be 
one of the root causes in what Luckman et al (2000) term the 
dichotomy of democracy between procedural democracy and 
substantive democracy.  In a substantive democracy, the general 
population plays a real role in carrying out its political affairs, i.e., the 
state is not merely set up as a democracy but is functionally one as 
well.  This type of democracy can also be referred to as a „functional‟ 
democracy.   A procedural democracy, on the other hand, is a state 
system that has in place the relevant official practices of democracy 
but is not actually managed democratically. As an example 
Zimbabwe can be characterised in this manner, since its constitution 
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is essentially democratic but in actuality the state is managed by a 
bureaucratic elite with little regard for the voice of its citizenry. 
 
3.1.1 The Washington Consensus 
 
In poorly governed nations, a set of transitional institutions may 
be what is required to transform the current set of institutions to its 
final intended form.  In other words, transitional institutions would 
assist to transform a procedural democracy into a substantive one.  
The structural recommendations would need to be customised to suit 
the nation‟s current state and make use of the current indigenous 
institutions where possible.  Economic reforms however are a plenty, 
and many political scientists tend to ignore the institutions already in 
place.  The world has prescribed various sets of reforms for the 
developing world with very little success.  
 
In 1989, many nations were asked to prescribe to a set of 
guidelines of key reforms in order to achieve economic growth.  
These guidelines were termed the Washington consensus.  Countries 
which subscribed to the „consensus‟ include: Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras, India, Mexico, Morocco, Nicaragua, Paraguay, 
Peru, Tunisia, Uruguay and  Zambia.   
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The 10 recommendations of the Washington Consensus include: 
(World Bank Poverty Report, 2000) 
1. Fiscal policy discipline  
2. Redirection of public spending toward education, health 
and infrastructure investment21  
3. Tax reform - Flattening the tax curve: Lowering the tax 
rates on proportionally high tax brackets (typically above 
median income), and raising the tax rates on the 
proportionally low tax brackets (typically below median 
income); lowering the marginal tax rate.  
4. Interest rates that are market determined and positive (but 
moderate) in real terms  
5. Competitive exchange rates  
6. Trade liberalisation - replacement of quantitative 
restrictions with low and uniform tariffs  
7. Openness to foreign direct investment  
8. Privatisation of state enterprises  
9. Deregulation - abolition of regulations that impede entry or 
restrict competition, except for those justified on safety, 
environmental and consumer protection grounds, and 
prudential oversight of financial institutions  
10. Legal security for property rights  
 
                                            
21
 Physical and human capital accumulation were thus targeted as key requirements for economic 
development. 
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Due to the pro-market and pro-liberalisation inclination of the 
„consensus‟ the set of recommendations have typically been seen as 
neo-liberal22 in its agenda.  The general aim of the consensus was 
centred on the economic principal that overregulation of the economy 
is bad for growth and that a more liberal economy is needed to 
stimulate economic growth.  The basis of the recommendations is 
that an economy will operate best once the private sector and the 
international community are able to operate freely without 
government intervention.  Thus the consensus focused very much on 
market liberalisation such as competitive exchange rates, the 
privatisation of parastatals and international trade liberalisation.  The 
consensus did not consider transitional procedures (as previously 
discussed) but rather expected governments to make the leap. 
 
The following chart (figure 3-1) depicts the economic 
performance of those countries signatory to the Washington 
consensus.  Performance in this case is measured in terms of GDP 
per capital in 1995 USD. 
                                            
22
 Neoliberalism refers to a political-economic philosophy that has had major implications for government 
policies beginning in the 1970s – and increasingly prominent since 1980 – that de-emphasises or rejects 
government intervention in the economy, focusing instead on achieving progress by encouraging free-
market methods and fewer restrictions on business operations and economic development. Supporters 
argue that by implementing business-friendly policies, a society can assure that its businesses grow, 
creating jobs and other economic benefits which improve the welfare of the entire economy. 
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Economic development since the implementation of the Washington Consensus
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Figure 3-1 Economic development since the implementation of the 
Washington Consensus (signatory countries only) 
 
A comparison of those countries which were signatories to the 
Washington Consensus to those which were not (table 3-1) reveals 
that signatory countries (with perhaps the exception of Chile23 and 
India) did not far exceed the average global economic performance.  
From the table, the benefits of adopting the consensus are not 
evident.  Many countries performed well or better than consensus 
signatories without immediate liberalisation and openness of their 
economies (such as China, Korea and Vietnam who achieved 200%, 
98% and 133% GDP per capital growth over the same period.)   
These latter success stories chose a path of government intervention 
                                            
23
 The case of Chile is often as the „complicated case‟ since it is unclear regarding the direct role of the 
Washington Consensus in stimulating growth.  Chile as a detailed case study will be discussed later in 
this paper. 
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and customised industrial policy to drive economic growth – a policy 
outcome completely opposite to the Washington Consensus 
recommendations but aligned to the needs of the developmental 
state. 
Code Country
% growth per capita 
(2003-1989)
BOL Bolivia 16%
BRA Brazil 6%
CHL Chile 72%
COL Colombia 12%
CRI Costa Rica 40%
DOM Dominican Republic 40%
ECU Ecuador 5%
GTM Guatemala 14%
HND Honduras 1%
IND India 68%
MEX Mexico 20%
MAR Morocco 18%
NIC Nicaragua 9%
PRY Paraguay -8%
PER Peru 19%
TUN Tunisia 55%
URY Uruguay 8%
ZMB Zambia -12%
Average of Washington Consensus signatories 21%
Best performer Chile 72%
Worst performer Zambia 1%
Average of the remainder of the World 19%
Best performer China 199%
Worst performer Congo, Dem. Rep. -63%
1989-2003)
 
Table 3-1 Performance of Washington Consensus signatories versus the 
remainder of the world. 
 
Anti-globalisation and anti-capitalist critics argue that the 
consensus' neo-liberal policies have been imposed on economically 
vulnerable countries and have in fact led them to crisis instead of 
overcoming it. Some leftist critics of trade liberalisation see the 
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consensus as a way of throwing open the labour market of an 
underdeveloped economy to exploitation by a more developed 
economy. Many of the other reforms (e.g. privatisation of state 
industries, tax reform, and deregulation) are thus seen as 
mechanisms for ensuring the development of a local monied elite 
who will then have a vested interest in maintaining the local status 
quo.  Other more liberal commentators argue that it was not the 
policies themselves, but the extreme speed at which they were 
implemented which caused the damage.  This latter view seems to 
support the need for a set of transitional institutions in order to make 
the progress more gradual and lasting. 
 
Most critics, including neo-Keynesians and post-Keynesians, 
argue that the underlining policies were incorrectly laid down and are 
too rigid to be able to succeed.  For example, flexible work laws were 
supposed to create new jobs, but economic evidence from South 
America draws no such conclusion.  In addition they do not take into 
account economic and cultural differences between countries.  They 
also point out that, should this set of policies work, it must be 
implemented during a period of rapid growth and not - as often is the 
case - during a crisis.  
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Thus, it may follow that such prescriptive recommendations as 
per the Washington Consensus may fail to take cognisance of the 
unique features of each country‟s economic challenge.  However 
when looking at the mixed results24 of those Washington Consensus 
signatories, there may be a place for a set of prescribed institutional 
recommendations which are broad enough to be of benefit to most 
countries.  Perhaps these general recommendations could lack the 
level of detail.  A more customised approach is likely to be more valid 
and successful.  The detail regarding the implementation of a broad 
set of institutional recommendations should be jointly decided 
between the technocrats and the prevailing politicians.  Only then can 
a customised approach to the developmental state be created which 
may be able to deliver more success than a broad brushed set of 
recommendations. 
 
3.1.2 Democratic institutions 
In terms of broad political institutional and political arrangements, 
the most successful countries today are all democratic. As can be 
seen in Figure 3.2, the top half of the curve is by far dominated by 
„free‟ economies25.  It follows then that there would be strong 
evidence to suggest that embracing democracy would be a logical 
                                            
24
 The success of the Washington consensus is still being debated in economic circles; however it is fair 
to say that, on average, signatory countries did not perform worse than non-signatories. 
25
 Freedom data provided by Freedom House (2005) in this case refers to a combination of political 
rights and civil liberties.  It should be noted that the neutrality of Freedom House has been questioned 
from time to time.  Freedom House research is funded by the U.S. government and critics often dispute 
the favoured results in support of the Western democratic definition of civil and political liberties. 
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first step to economic development.   The debate on this issue is 
however far from resolved.   
Economic wealth vs. level of political and civil freedom 
(wealth measured in 2003, political freedom measured in 2005)
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Figure 3-2 Wealth vs. level of political and civil freedom 
 
Przeworski and Limongi (1993) suggest that both democracies 
and autocracies can support economic growth.  “Arguments that 
relate regimes to growth focus on property rights, pressures for 
immediate consumption, and the autonomy of dictators.  While 
everyone seems to agree that secure property rights foster growth, it 
is controversial whether democracies or dictatorships better secure 
these rights.”   
 
Asian economic growth patterns seem to suggest that autocracy 
is far better for economic growth.  The major weakness of democracy 
  
Page 59 of 206 
in terms of its ability to deliver long term economic growth is that it 
appears to be undermined by pressures for current consumption.  
“These demands in turn threaten profits; hence they reduce 
investment and retard growth.  Democracy is thus inimical to 
economic development” (Przeworski and Limongi, 1993).  The 
principle thought behind this philosophy is that democracies are more 
open to public pressures and therefore may not be adequately 
isolated from the public to make long term investment decisions 
which may be uncomfortable to the present population.  One such 
example to be taken from South Africa is the recent increased 
political pressure place on monetary policy by union groups.  South 
Africa is in a way adopting a fiscal stabilisation strategy through 
inflation targeting.  However, the strength of the currency is putting 
certain industry sectors at risk and thereby jeopardising jobs26.  The 
unions however would rather see inflationary instability then risk the 
loss of employment – this is a good representation of a short term 
focus over the long term strategy.  South Africa is however fortunate 
in its democracy since the level of political contestation is relatively 
low.  The current ruling party (African National Congress) has a clear 
majority as it won over 69% of the votes in the 2004 general 
elections.  This gives the party some of the legitimacy and autonomy 
                                            
26
 Those sectors principally placed at risk are the minerals sector – since their earnings are denominated 
in foreign currency while the majority of costs are in the local currency.  Therefore a strengthening of the 
local currency in effect increases the cost of doing business.  
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to entrench difficult economic reforms required for the long term 
growth of South Africa. 
 
The question why dictators would behave in a developmentalist 
fashion has been studied by some scholars and it engages in 
comparisons of the Far East and Latin America.  In this view, the key 
to the superior economic performance of the East Asian „tigers‟ is 
state autonomy, defined as a combination of the „capacity‟ of the 
state to pursue developmentalist policies with its „insulation‟ from 
populist pressures, - particularly those originating from large firms or 
unions.  The argument regarding growth favouring dictators is based 
on the following two assumptions:  (1) state autonomy favours growth 
and (2) state autonomy is only possible under authoritarianism. 
 
The following chart compares the freedom house data with 
economic growth over the period of 1989-2003.  As can be seen the 
results are much more mixed with the top end of the growth 
economies dominated by un-free and partly free economies.  This 
could be for a number of reasons, most notably: 1. Economies that 
are un-free are relatively poor, therefore any increase measured 
relative to the base year can be mistaken for exceptional 
performance. 2.  The economies in question grew faster than free 
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economies due to the isolation of the state – which leads to its ability 
to adopt harsh policies necessary for long-term growth. 
Economic growth vs. level of political and civil freedom
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Figure 3-3 Economic growth vs. level of political and civil freedom 
 
The danger associated with the adoption of an autocracy is the 
increased likelihood of predatory behaviour by the state.  Previously 
in this paper the difficulties and challenges surrounding resource-rich 
countries due to rent-seeking were discussed.  Several models which 
view state autonomy as pernicious for economic performance 
position an argument that the state is always ready to prey on the 
society and only democratic institutions can constrain it to act in a 
general interest.  From this perspective autocracies of all types can 
be seen as a source of inefficiency and according to Rodrik (1997), 
“the bottom line is that living under an authoritarian regime is a much 
riskier gamble than living under a democracy.”  There can however, 
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under certain circumstances emerge a benevolent dictator.  The 
benevolent dictator is a more modern version of the classical 
"enlightened despot", being an undemocratic or authoritarian leader 
who exercises his or her political power for the benefit of the people 
rather than exclusively for his or her own self-interest or benefit, or for 
the benefit of only a small portion of the people. 
 
Africa‟s poor economic performance over the last 20 years seems 
to support the view that authoritarianism is riskier.  Figure 3.4 
demonstrates the economic growth of Africa between 1989 and 2003.  
The various countries are also categorised according to the Freedom 
House grading system.  As can be seen all „free‟ economies (with the 
exception of two)27 achieved an increase in GDP per capital over this 
period, while the results of the „not free‟ and partially „free economies‟ 
were much more mixed and varied.  On average, free economies 
achieved a GDP per capita increase of 30%, while not free and 
partially free economies achieved growth rates of -1%.   
                                            
27
 Sao Tome and Principe achieved a -1% GDP per capital decrease while South Africa achieved -2%.  
In the case of South Africa, there is a mismatch between the Freedom House data and economic 
performance, since South African can only be considered as „free‟ post the 1994 general elections, in 
which case the graph would have shown South Africa to have achieved 10% growth. 
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Economic growth vs. freedom (African countries only)
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Figure 3-4 Economic growth vs. level of political and civil freedom (African 
countries only) 
 
Analysing the data through statistical methods yields some 
interesting insights.  As can be seen in figures 3-5 and 3-6, „free‟ 
countries in Africa performed somewhat better then the global 
average of free countries, yielding some optimism for African 
economic growth28.  Partly free countries performed somewhat worse 
than the global average while the not free countries performed 
significantly worse.  
                                            
28
 This could be party due to the low starting point (GDP per capita 1989) for most African countries 
when compared against the rest of the world. 
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Growth outcomes and level of freedom
Free 
Mean=26%
Median = 25%
Partly free 
Mean =6%
Median = 8% 
Not free 
Mean=15%
Median = 6% 
-200% -150% -100% -50% 0% 50% 100% 150% 200% 250% 300% 350% 400%
 GDP per capita growth (1989-2003)
 
free partly free not free
Minimum -21% -117% -70%
Mean 26% 6% 23%
Median 25% 6% 6%
Mode 22% 8% -12%
Maximum 86% 124% 1561%
Std Dev 21% 32% 76%
Variance 5% 10% 58%
Skewness 0.20 0.00 5.34
Kurtosis 2.39 3.00 66.17
Left X -0.07 -0.07 -0.07
Left P 0.05 0.34 0.37
Right X 0.63 0.63 0.63
Right P 0.95 0.96 0.83
Diff. X 0.70 0.70 0.70
Diff. P 0.90 0.62 0.46
5th Perc. -7% -46% -45%
95th Perc. 63% 59% 143%
 
 
Figure 3-5 Growth outcomes and level of freedom 
 
 Growth outcomes and level of freedom (African countries only)
Free
Mean =30%
Median = 30%
Partly free
Mean=(-3)%
Median = (-3)% 
Not free
Mean=1.5%
Median = 1.5%
-200% -150% -100% -50% 0% 50% 100% 150% 200% 250% 300% 350% 400%
 GDP per capita growth (1989-2003)
 
free partly free not free
Minimum -55% -114% -74%
Mean 30% -3% 20%
Median 30% -3% 2%
Mode 32% -3% -13%
Maximum 112% 119% 1446%
Std Dev 23% 31% 78%
Variance 5% 10% 61%
Skewness 0.00 0.00 5.06
Kurtosis 2.99 3.00 55.68
Left X -0.08 -0.08 -0.08
Left P 0.05 0.44 0.40
Right X 0.67 0.67 0.67
Right P 0.95 0.99 0.85
Diff. X 0.75 0.75 0.75
Diff. P 0.90 0.55 0.45
5th Perc. -8% -54% -48%
95th Perc. 67% 48% 142%
 
 
Figure 3-6 Growth outcomes and level of freedom (African countries only) 
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These results suggest that autocracies and dictatorships do not 
perform as well in Africa as they may in the rest of the world.  This 
leads one to conclude that Africa suffers from a shortage of 
benevolent dictators and that African dictators do not restrict civil and 
political liberties to adopt harsh policies which will deliver high growth 
rates.  They rather restrict liberties to pursue other paths which may 
include rent-seeking and self-enrichment at the cost of economic 
growth.  Part of this phenomenon could be due to the inability of 
autocratic African governments to maintain order and peace,29 thus 
they need to rapaciously develop and control their extractive 
industries to maintain a politico-economic balance through the 
transfer of rents.  Given this outcome, it follows that a first step in 
achieving growth from natural resources in Africa is to create a set of 
incentives for autocratic governments to adopt a set of transitional 
institutions to eventually guide them from autocracy to substantive 
democracy. 
 
A geographical representation of freedom (as in figure 3-7) shows 
clustering of freedom ratings in various parts of Africa.  This is 
indicative of a regional effect, whereby free economies tend to be 
positioned next to „partially free‟ economies, while „partially free‟ 
                                            
29
 As previously discussed in detail under section 2.7 – „the political economy of the resource curse‟, 
autocratic governments in Africa (and challengers to power) rely heavily upon resource rents to manage 
the system of incentives in corrupt governments.  This point touches on the political economy of the 
resource curse as well and the role of natural resources in fuelling conflict. 
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economies are located adjacent to „not free‟ economies.  It would 
then appear as though freedom is spreading from the South to the 
North, as well as from the West to East.  This phenomenon is likely 
due to border spill-over whereby freedom or democracy (civil 
liberties) are being strengthened in a few clusters and then spreading 
over to adjacent countries.  One likely causal mechanism for this 
phenomenon is through increased regionalisation and trade as well 
as through various multilateral institutions such as SADC, the AU and 
NEPAD. 
free
partly free
not free
 
Figure 3-7 Geographical representation of Freedom House Survey 
Results, 2002 (Africa only) 
 
Other than merely stimulating economic growth (or at least 
preventing negative growth), an additional benefit to adopting 
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democracy is that it is the most peaceful mechanism for transitioning 
between different forms of government and political parties known 
today.  It gains its legitimacy through the popular vote which gives 
voice to the people.   
 
In this section a functional democracy was seen to be akin to a 
free economy according to the freedom house survey.  The not free 
countries were seen to be akin to either suppressed procedural 
democracies (as in Zimbabwe) or autocracies.  In examining the data 
it appears that the African track record has benefited most from 
„deep‟ democratic social institutions.  This forms the starting point of 
this paper and the remaining arguments are based from this point of 
departure.   
 
3.1.3 Property rights and political institutions 
Property rights and their security is most likely the single most 
important factor when considering the importance of institutions for 
economic growth.  An essential characteristic of capitalism is 
adherence to the rule of law in establishing and protecting property, 
including, most notably, private ownership of the means of 
production.  It has been argued that a strong formal property and 
legal system makes possible:  
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a) greater independence;  
b) clear and provable protected ownership;  
c) the standardisation and integration of property rules and 
property information in the country as a whole;  
d) increased trust arising from a greater certainty of punishment 
for cheating in economic transactions;  
e) more formal and complex written statements of ownership 
that facilitates the easier assumption of shared risk and 
ownership in companies, and the insurance of risk;  
f) greater availability of loans30 for new projects, since more 
„things‟ can be used as collateral for the loans;  
g) easier and more reliable information regarding such things as 
credit history and the worth of assets;  
h) an increased fungibility, standardisation and transferability of 
statements documenting the ownership of property,  
 
All of these benefits to property rights have historically enhanced 
the economic growth of western countries.  Historical analysis 
demonstrates that the above benefits paved the way for structures 
such as national markets for companies and the easy transportation 
of property through complex networks of individuals and other 
entities.   
 
                                            
30
 This is possibly one of the strongest developmental reasons for land reform in Africa.  Property rights 
or ownership of land makes it possible for individuals to seek loans to improve productivity, invest in the 
economy and assist to smooth out seasonal cash constraints.  This in turn allows for greater risk taking, 
savings and (hopefully) sustainable economic growth.  Microfinance as a tool to assist in economic 
development is dependant upon incumbents using their property or other assets as collateral. 
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Capitalism is often contrasted to socialism in that besides 
embracing private property in terms of personal possessions, it 
supports private ownership of the means of production. Those who 
support capitalism often credit the lack of control over the means of 
production by government as crucial to maximising economic output. 
Few however, go as far as Ludwig von Mises (2004) in support of 
property rights, who emphasises that the "history of private ownership 
of the means of production coincides with the history of the 
development of mankind from an animal-like condition to the highest 
reaches of modern civilisation."  In all modern economies some of the 
means of production are owned by the state; however an economy is 
not considered capitalist unless the bulk of ownership is private.  
Some characterise those that have a mixture of state and private 
ownership as "mixed economies." 
 
Property rights are fundamental to developing an economy under 
pure capitalist or „mixed‟ conditions.  However simply enshrining 
property rights into the constitution is not merely enough.  In much of 
the developing world, there remains the issue of capability of 
government, its institutions and its ability to enforce property rights as 
well as the ability of society to keep the government in check.   
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Reminding ourselves now of the politico-economic considerations 
of the resource curse (or of resource dependant economies) the 
question remains:  With all its mineral wealth, how can a resource-
rich government ensure that the most benefit is „literally‟ extracted 
from the ground?  Khan (2002) has stated that: 
 
 “The key institutions enforced by the state include the 
system of property rights, the interventions that define 
rents and incentive structures (which includes taxes and 
subsidies), and the higher level political institutions such 
as democratic or authoritarian decision-making bodies 
that describe the rules for changing rules.” – Khan (2002) 
 
 
This statement applies generally to all sectors of the economy 
and can be verified for suitability to the extractive industries sector by 
the Fraser Institute‟s – Mineral Investment Attractiveness Survey 
(2003-2004).  The survey highlights that certainty regarding the 
application of existing legislation is of prime importance to mining 
executives; however the type of political institutions is not of prime 
concern in itself.  It is rather the stability of the institutions adopted by 
the government that is currently in power, and the possibility that a 
subsequent and replacement political party would have significantly 
different policy stances than the ruling party.  Essentially natural 
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resource based industries are long-term, capital intensive industries.  
Although the extractive industry expects that there would be some 
degree of tax reform over this period, it is the magnitude and its effect 
on the change and security of tenure that are of prime concern.31 32   
 
The „perceived‟ risk to a company when considering the 
investment rests not with whether the current constitution enshrines 
their rights over the resource, but more importantly it is whether this 
right could be revoked at some later stage.  As any such violation 
would need to be brought to the local court in a time of dispute, the 
ability and independence of the judiciary will then determine the 
validity of the claim and if any wrongdoing has transpired. 
 
3.1.4 Independence of the judiciary 
In order to ensure that the proper checks and balances are in 
place, the judiciary must be independent of the State.  It must be 
sufficiently isolated from political pressures in order to enforce the 
rule of law regardless of the political stature of the accused.  In 
general, the judiciary must be separate from the legislative and 
executive branches of government - this is commonly known as the 
                                            
31
 These points are only of prime concern if the development of the extractive industries will largely be 
funded by foreign multinational corporations.  Hence political stability in this case is important for 
attracting foreign direct investment. 
32
 In the extractive industries, property rights can be seen as synonymous to the mining right or 
extraction rights in oil.  As the convention in most countries is for the state to own the resources of the 
country, a company may have the „right‟ to extract these for the benefit of the country.  If the right to 
extract is fungible, then in essence it can be seen to be the same as a property right. 
  
Page 72 of 206 
“separation of powers.”  The powers of a sovereign government 
should split between two or more strongly independent entities, 
preventing any one person or group from gaining too much power.  
This statement holds true in the case of substantive democracy, 
however this does not apply in the case of autocracies.  
 
In the case of a benevolent dictator, such a character would 
control much of the power, thus independence of the judiciary would 
not necessarily be guaranteed.  When specifically considering this 
risk in the context of Africa, the risk of a violation of rights under a 
non-independent judiciary is higher than in the remainder of the 
world.  Recalling evidence from previous discussions, predatory 
behaviour by the state resulting in poor economic growth in Africa 
remains a risk of autocracies, as African states tend to suffer from a 
shortage of benevolent dictators.   
 
However, simply superimposing the American or British 
governmental structures onto an African state would likely yield 
unsatisfactory results as the capacity to manage such complex and 
far reaching bureaucracies would not yet exist within the state.  The 
societal predisposition of Aristotelian thought surfaces once again, 
since the idea that these different functions (judiciary and 
government) should be vested in different institutions finds its first 
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ancestry in Aristotle.  The separation of powers forms a part of 
western social capital.  As many African communities are still 
nurturing young democracies and emerging from a patriarchal form of 
leadership it is with great uncertainty how one could foresee how 
African citizens (in the most undeveloped nations) would support and 
fulfil their role in enforcing these institutions.  Without the proper 
educational background of the citizenry, these complex bureaucratic 
structures and procedural norms are likely to falter.  Almond and 
Verba (1963, cited in Diamond 1992) found that educational 
attainment33 had “the most important demographic effect on political 
attitudes.”  Furthermore, Diamond (1992) concludes that “it is not 
economic development per se and certainly not mere economic 
growth that is the most important developmental factor in promoting 
democracy.  Rather it is the dense cluster of social changes and 
improvements.”  
 
The idea of "checks and balances", coined by Montesquieu 
(1689-1755) also forms part of western social capital stock and the 
concept needs to be integrated into African society to function 
properly. In a system of government with competing sovereigns, 
"checks" refers to the ability, right, and responsibility of each power to 
                                            
33
 The link between human capital and social capital is somewhat intuitive, however the debate remains 
as to the direction of causality.  The need for human capital stock will be examined in greater detail in 
this report. 
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monitor the activities of the others; "balances" refers to the ability of 
each entity to use its authority to limit the powers of the others, 
whether in general scope or in particular cases.  Keeping each 
independent entity within its prescribed powers can be a delicate 
process.  Public support by informed citizenry, tradition, and well-
balanced tactical positions do help maintain such systems34.   
 
The „voice‟35 of the people plays a key role in a functioning 
democracy.  Freedom of speech and the freedom to challenge the 
decisions of government are essential to a functioning representative 
democracy.  There must be a mechanism by which the citizenry can 
challenge government decision making outside of the electoral 
process.   The independent judiciary provides this proper forum, to 
ensure that each citizen has the right to challenge government, to 
further ensure that the constitution is being upheld and that new laws 
do not impinge upon civil liberties and are generally supported by the 
populace.  
 
                                            
34
 In Africa, and in many emerging countries, the citizenry are poorly informed – either through poorly 
established communications infrastructure or through a lack of human capital (education).  The traditions 
of democratic process have not yet been formed and internalised in society as the democracy in 
question may still be very young.  Furthermore, the well-balanced tactical political positions may be 
scarce due to the various pressures associated with the political economy of the resource curse. 
35
 Democracy develops the concept of voice through the concept of voting which gives legitimacy to the 
government.  However this normally only occurs every 4-5 years (on average) and other forms of „voice‟ 
are required for a functioning democracy.  Other forms include but are not limited to: referendums, civil 
action and a multitude of government watchdogs and NGOs. 
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3.1.5 Meritocracy 
The key functions of the state in a democracy “are to provide 
protection for property rights and to deliver democratically decided-
upon public goods efficiently” (Khan 2002).  A major inhibitor to 
African states is their inability to deliver services due to a lack of 
capacity.  A lack of capacity in turn can be a lack of funds, a lack of 
“reach” or simply a lack of human capital which hampers the quality 
of decision making throughout the government‟s bureaucracy.  One 
method to ensure that the state has the capacity to deliver is to 
ensure that the state bureaucracy has the correct people appointed in 
the correct positions.  Often and especially in many African countries, 
highly respected positions of government are awarded in return for 
political support36 (Bratton & can der Walle, 1997).  Due principally to 
a lack of incentives to achieve personal success in a (non-existent) 
market economy, wealth and power is sought through the state 
mechanism, thus government officials attempt to secure as big a 
portion of the pie for themselves through rent-seeking or through 
giving support to superiors in the form of political favours.  This 
system of clientelism is supported by systematic rent-seeking 
whereby the setting of high taxes allows government to create 
various economic rents that could be used to dispense political 
favours.    “The constant redistribution of state resources for political 
                                            
36
 Once again, this outcome is driven in part by the politico economic dimension of the resource curse. 
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purposes [leads] to endemic fiscal crisis and diminished prospects for 
sustained economic growth.  The dynamics of neopatrimonial rule37 
[has] ensured that African states routinely [outspend] their revenues 
by a large margin” (ibid)  This in turn has created such a climate of 
uncertainty in political leadership and stability that it has virtually 
frightened all potential and current investors away – except for those 
ventures which prove sufficiently lucrative to tolerate the risks38.  This 
in turn can limit the amount of economic diversity present in the 
economy.  Private investors will seek to limit their exposure to these 
perceived risks through geographical diversification thus limiting their 
dependency on the host country. 
 
One mechanism to overcome cronyism and corruption in 
government is to make appointments according to merit, and not 
according to ethnic, familial or political lines.  A meritocracy mediated 
either through a careful selection process can not only raise the 
calibre of the bureaucracy, but also create a sense of pride and 
elitism which would transcend to improved service delivery (Tendler, 
1997).  Tendler‟s recount of health care professionals in Brazil 
discusses how central government support, the interviewing process 
and publicity about government programmes through the media can 
                                            
37
 Max Weber‟s definition (cited in Speck, 2005) of the patrimonial political system is one where “all 
government authority and the corresponding economic rights tend to be treated as privately appropriated 
economic advantages.” 
38
 Such high return investments are typical of many of the natural resources being developed in Africa. 
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help to create a sense of pride amongst government workers which 
can deliver results in difficult circumstances. 
 
However, only one part of the meritocracy issue has been 
resolved by getting the right people in the right places.  Governments 
must create challenging and rewarding careers for their staff in order 
to retain them.  The correct measures and incentives must be 
adopted to ensure that promotion will follow performance.  Good 
performance must be linked to career and financial gains as this will 
be the only way to reduce incentives for petty corruption.  
Government officials should also be sufficiently isolated from 
politicians in order to further reduce the tendency for political favours 
to be asked of officials. 
 
3.1.6 Transparency  
Transparency is essential to service delivery and effective 
governance.  It is through the access of information that the public 
and other agencies can hold governments accountable.  
Transparency must not only be in the form of political association and 
motives of political leaders, the formation of the national budget and 
in the spending of national funds but it is also recently emerging as 
an issue on a more private-public level.  In recent literature and press 
headlines, transparency has emerged as a very relevant topic to the 
extractive industries sectors – specifically with regards to the amount 
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of money paid to governments in terms of export duties, royalties and 
taxes generated through the development of natural resources.  Due 
to the magnitude of the rents generated through the extractive 
industries, the degree of rent-seeking and the amount of resource-
based political conflict present on the African continent, transparency 
in terms of payments made to Government is soon to become 
business as usual in Africa for publicly listed companies. 
 
There have already been some recent cases of resistance by 
governments to this initiative.  For example, British Petroleum (BP) 
has agreed to participate in the “Publish what you pay” campaign, 
however in declaring its intent, the Government of Angola has 
threatened to sue the company if it follows through.   
 
Such initiatives denote a shift in global policy and an 
impingement on national sovereignty.  Given the low levels of social 
capital and the inability of many third world citizens to properly 
engage with government, western market and multilateral institutions 
have justifiably had to fill the gap in „checks and balances‟.   
 
The transparency provided for through market institutions 
ensures that corporate citizenship is followed.  If in the previous case, 
the Angolan government insisted that BP not declare the amounts 
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paid to Government, BP may need to withdraw its investment.  This in 
turn would have repercussions as most foreign firms could see 
Angola as a „no-go‟ zone and the Angolan economy could then suffer 
a set-back due to lack of production and foreign investment.39  
Pressure would then build up on the Angolan government by various 
factions and something would need to be done to remit the situation.  
In any case, the presence of transparent market based institutions in 
this case should assist to ensure good governance and expose if not 
merely deter its occurrence in the first place. 
 
3.1.7 Corruption & rent-seeking 
The key determinant to successful institutional reform in Africa 
will be the amount by which any reform reduces corruption and rent-
seeking behaviour.  Corruption has a significant effect on the 
contribution of the extractive industries to the broader economy, since 
corruption and rent-seeking inevitably results in the misallocation of 
government resources and efforts.  Rather than maximising the 
interest of the public through the economy, corruption and rent-
seeking seeks to maximise the interests of the few who have power.  
To change corruption and rent-seeking one must change the 
structure and nature of incentives which form the politico economy.  
As the current corrupt practices have to differing degrees become 
                                            
39
 Perhaps more importantly for the Angolan government, they would not be able to capture rents from 
the oil revenue during a period booming prices. 
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entrenched within existing institutions, change will have to come 
piecemeal and by trial and error and thus there is recognition of a 
need for a transitional period. 
 
As previously discussed, to change the current structure of 
political economy the current patterns must be deterred and new 
patterns must be encouraged.  These pressures will not always come 
from within, as in many developing countries a “voice” has not yet 
been well established.  The change agent will therefore be catalysed 
by other actors and facilitated through multilateral and market 
institutions. 
 
3.1.8 Multilateral institutions 
Multilateral institutions are present to support African countries in 
making the required structural adjustments.  Institutions such as the 
World Bank Group (WBG), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
and to a lesser degree, the World Trade Organisation (WTO) are 
continuously revising policy research in hopes that they are able to 
arrive at workable solutions to today‟s developmental challenges.   
 
Although often received as neo-colonial and pro-capitalist 
institutions, the WBG and the IMF can be seen as more pro-
development than the WTO.  However, through the collapse of the 
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WTO‟s Cancun talks, developing nations appear to be gaining more 
equitable terms in world trade.  Although the terms appear to be 
improving, the WTO‟s stance is still very much pro-liberalisation, 
although it makes arguments that liberalising trade is a step towards 
development or at least growth.    
 
It is important to underline the extent to which multilateral 
institutions such as the WBG and the IMF are committed to structural 
adjustment programmes in Africa.  Between 1981-2003, 35 countries 
in Sub-Saharan African implemented 162 structural adjustment 
programmes with the help of the WBG and the IMF.  By comparison, 
the remainder of the world only saw 126 structural adjustment 
programmes implemented over the same period (Campbell, 2003). 
One central aspect of the state restructurings (due principally to the 
effects of the resource curse) saw the withdrawal of the state from the 
mining sector.  Among other reasons, these assets were principally 
sold in order to reduce fiscal deficits40.  
 
Much of the re-structuring taking place within the African 
economies has been directed towards creating the correct enabling 
environment to attract foreign direct investment (FDI).  In doing so 
however, the WBG and the IMF have failed to customise solutions to 
                                            
40
 This can be interpreted as an inducement by the various multilaterals to effect structural change. 
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the State‟s immediate requirements and often leave loose ends which 
have proven to be the weakness of previous Bank and Fund 
initiatives.  While the liberalisation strategies have clearly contributed 
to the attraction of FDI, with respect to the mining sector, the new 
policies “appear to fall very short of permitting sustainable 
development strategies and the introduction of norms and standards 
with regard to the protection of the environment, social impacts on 
labour, conducive to such strategies” (ibid).  Although structural 
reform is much needed in Africa and the remainder of the developing 
world, one of the unintentional effects of new policy recommendations 
(from Western multilaterals) is that they tend to reduce the fiscal 
strength of the state, of its capacity to monitor and enforce and 
consequently decreases the legitimacy and sovereignty of the state, 
(ibid). 
 
Other criticisms of the World Banks‟ and the WTO‟s 
recommendations come from Mabogunje (2004) who states that 
restructuring policies coming from the Bank encouraged more 
liberalist and market based services.  This in turn has caused a hasty 
retreat of many African governments away from service delivery to 
rural communities.  The vacuum created from the retreat created 
severe shocks which have worsened the conditions of rural 
communities.  Furthermore, globalisation as encouraged by the WTO 
has meant the exposure of Sub-Saharan Africa‟s regional economies 
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to various external shocks, especially those due to commodity cycles, 
deteriorating terms of trade and adverse climatic conditions. 
 
Additional multilateral institutions which are increasingly affecting 
the role of extractive industries in Africa are the Kimberley Process 
Certification Scheme and the New Partnership for Africa‟s 
Development.   
 
The Kimberley Certification Scheme, institutionalised by the 
World Federation of Diamond Bourses and the International Diamond 
Manufacturers Association is a form of industry self-regulation which 
strives to reduce the spread of conflict diamonds, by creating a 
process of warrantees for every legitimate diamond mined throughout 
the world.  Through this certificate scheme it is illegal to import or cut 
any raw diamond that does not contain its unique certificate 
authorised by the Minister of Mines/Natural Resources of the host 
country (World Diamond Congress 2002).  Though not without its 
problems, the Kimberley Process is a first and necessary step in 
promoting ethical responsibility in the diamond trade.  Criticisms of 
the Kimberley Process come mostly from NGOs and deal specifically 
with the lack of mechanisms for which to audit countries.  However 
inadequate the current certification process is, there are mechanisms 
in place for which to change the process.  For example news 
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headlines in 2004 (Katz, 2004a) tell of the Republic of the Congo‟s 
exclusion from the Kimberley Process.  A Kimberley Process review 
mission‟s findings indicate that Kimberley Process “participants 
cannot be confident that conflict diamonds are not entering the 
legitimate trade in rough diamonds through the Republic of Congo.”  
The report goes further to recommend that “according to all 
participants‟ national regulations, [they] must immediately advise their 
customs authorities to not accept shipments of rough diamonds with 
[Kimberley Process] certificates issued by the Republic of Congo.”   
 
The diamond industry‟s success is dependant upon the 
association of its product with love, glamour and purity.  It is for this 
reason that it is in the best interest of all diamond mining companies, 
downstream sectors and diamond producing countries to ensure that 
the Kimberley Process is successful in legitimising the trade of all 
diamonds.  The international boycott implemented on the Republic of 
the Congo‟s diamonds sends a signal to corrupt and rent-seeking 
government officials that if they wish to manage their natural 
resources, they must do it within legitimate channels and that the 
World will not allow mineral wealth to fuel African civil wars any 
longer. 
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Having realised that capacity to manage the trade of diamonds is 
lacking in many parts of the developed world, the Kimberley Process 
(KP) has made it the responsibility of other KP signatories to assist 
with the development of such capacity.  It is with the realisation that if 
one country fails in securing the value of diamonds all countries will 
suffer the consequences that has unified nations in this effort.  The 
KP process is an excellent example of how the diamond producing 
countries of all wealth levels, in combination with corporations can 
work together multilaterally to secure the best interests of the many. 
 
A second recent institutional mechanism which very much affects 
the future growth prospects of Africa comes from the NEPAD.  One of 
the unique features that makes the NEPAD so promising for the 
delivery of development is that it is a development strategy developed 
for Africa by Africans and not another package of policies handed 
down from Washington.  Although, the fundamentals of many 
contemporary „Washington Consensus‟ policy recommendations are 
incorporated within the NEPAD, the fact that it is being sold by 
Africans to other African leaders as a path out of poverty gives the 
programme more legitimacy and appears to give more political will to 
the process as there is now ownership and perhaps more drive to 
make it work. 
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The goals of the NEPAD are threefold: reduce poverty, achieve 
sustainable economic development and achieve access to markets.  
The continent of Africa has been broadly recognised as an 
indispensable resource to the world community.  Most notably of 
those resources it has to offer are the natural resources- both mineral 
and agricultural.  NEPAD recognises that in order to achieve 
sustainable economic development and a reduction in poverty for all 
Africans, these natural resources must be managed wisely. 
 
The structure of the NEPAD is such that the whole is comprised 
of a number of smaller initiatives ranging from issues of peace and 
security to human resources development.  Of most direct relevance 
to the extractive industries are: (NEPAD 2001a) 
 
1. The Capital Flows Initiative – (iv) Private Capital Flows. 
2. The Market Access Initiative – (i) Diversification of Production 
and (iii) Mining 
 
Through the capital flows initiative, the NEPAD seeks to increase 
private capital flows to Africa. “The first priority is to address investors‟ 
perception of Africa as a “high-risk” continent, especially with regard 
to security of property rights, regulatory frameworks and markets”  
(NEPAD 2001b).  Furthermore, NEPAD realises that taxation and 
investment regimes play a major role in promoting or discouraging 
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investment.  It is therefore crucial that African governments ensure 
that they adopt policies and practices that are in line with best 
practice.  The definition of best practice is however vague although 
this could be intentional to allow for the customisation of policies to a 
country‟s immediate circumstances. 
 
In the market access initiative, NEPAD recommends that all 
signatory governments create environments in which mineral 
beneficiation should be encouraged through regional linkages.  
Private enterprise must be supported and to this end, policies – both 
mineral-specific and national, must be drafted to encourage this 
behaviour.  While specifically related to mining, NEPAD urges 
governments to “create a regulatory framework that is conducive to 
the development of the mining sector while establishing best practice 
that will ensure efficient extraction of natural resources.”   
 
One of the key institutional arrangements in the NEPAD is the 
peer review mechanism, which calls for the review of African leaders 
and country performance by a jury of peers.  The instrument is a 
„non-penalty‟ mechanism whereby it is expected that acceptable 
economic and political performance will be deliberated upon by a 
forum of peer leaders.  The mechanism has been recently criticised 
by the private sector and NGOs alike for lacking the power to induce 
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change in faltering nations.  The peer review process is to be the 
driving force behind NEPAD, however without the necessary punitive 
powers to keep countries in line it is difficult to understand how and 
why countries could be induced to comply41.  However one must also 
ask themselves if the peer review mechanism does not include an 
element of African social capital which could unlock the secret to its 
legitimacy and enduring success.  Perhaps the core to the NEPAD‟s 
success is intuitively not meant to be understood by Westerners as it 
may rely upon social qualities which the West is not accustomed to.  
If NEPAD is relying upon unique African cultural values, then one 
example of such social values which affirms the peer review 
mechanism is ubuntu42. Ubuntu is seen as one of the founding 
principles of the new Republic of South Africa and is connected to the 
idea of an “African Renaissance”.  In the political sphere, the concept 
of ubuntu is used to emphasise the need for unity or consensus in 
decision-making, as well as the need for a suitably humanitarian ethic 
to inform those decisions.  Louw (1998) suggests that the concept of 
ubuntu defines the individual in terms of their relationships with 
others, and stresses the importance of ubuntu as a religious concept, 
stating that while the Zulu “maxim umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu” ("a 
                                            
41
 Considering the blatant disregard for good governance displayed by many African leaders over the 
last 50 years it is difficult to understand how a peer review mechanism could create the „right‟ incentives 
to induce institutional  reforms. 
42
 Ubuntu is a South African ethic or ideology focusing on people's allegiances and relations with each 
other.  According to Tutu (2000) ubuntu can be defined as: “A person with ubuntu is open and available 
to others, affirming of others, does not feel threatened that others are able and good, for he or she has a 
proper self-assurance that comes from knowing that he or she belongs in a greater whole and is 
diminished when others are humiliated or diminished, when others are tortured or oppressed.” 
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person is a person through other persons")43 may have no apparent 
religious connotations in the context of Western society, in an African 
context it suggests that through one‟s actions with humanity, one may 
become an ancestor worthy of respect or veneration.  Those who 
uphold the principle of ubuntu throughout their lives will, in death, 
achieve a unity with those still living. Extending this to nation building 
it can be suggested that “ubuntu” be expanded upon to believe that a 
nation is a nation through other nations, or that peoples are peoples 
through other peoples.  It is certainly hoped that the NEPAD 
represents the first of many successful truly „African‟ institutions 
which find their strength drawing upon African44 core values merging 
with Western policy recommendations. 
 
3.1.9 Market institutions 
Market driven institutions based on complete and „perfect‟ 
information, open and fair transactions, fluidity of capital and 
information, and the lack of price & resource allocation distortions are 
one of the driving mechanisms of today‟s successful and modern 
western economies.  In the pursuit of maximising the benefit of 
natural resources, the market certainly has a key role to play. 
                                            
43
 Extending this to nation building it can be suggested ubuntu be expanded upon to believe that “a 
nation is a nation through other nations”, or alternatively that “peoples are peoples through other 
peoples”. 
44
 African culture is as diverse as the many languages spoken in Africa.  The NEPAD and South Africa‟s 
vision of the “African Renaissance” may represent a cultural mismatch between South Africa‟s social 
capital (underpinned by Ubuntu) and the social capital stock of other African countries.  Hence, although 
the NEPAD‟s peer review mechanism makes use of African social capital its performance may be 
suboptimal in the same fashion as Western institutions based on western social capital have been 
historically.  Having said this, Africa is perhaps one step closer to a better cultural fit. 
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The market works in the following manner: it maximises the good 
of the public at large by maximising the good of the many smaller 
private needs.  From a neoclassical economics perspective, all 
agents are assumed to be utility-maximising and possess rational 
expectations. At any one time, the macro-economy is assumed to 
have a unique equilibrium at full employment or potential output and 
this equilibrium is assumed to always have been achieved via price 
and wage adjustment (market clearing).  Every enterprise acts 
according to its own needs and the way it interprets information.  
However just as information is not always perfect, neither are 
markets.  There are also certain public goods45 which cannot be 
generated effectively through private means and are best provided by 
the state.  There is therefore a necessary symbiotic relationship 
between the state and the market.   
 
There is however a difference in the role a state should play 
depending upon the level of development.  In a developed economy 
the state can take a less active role in the goings on of the economy 
and leave more to the market, but in the contemporary notion of 
                                            
45
 Public goods can include education, health care, national defense, national infrastructure such as 
roads, railways, ports and communication infrastructure to name a few. 
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today‟s developmental state46, much more involvement is required by 
government in order to get markets to work in a manner which 
optimises the public good. 
 
There are several methods by which markets or market 
institutions can serve in maximising the benefit of natural resources 
towards African development.     
 
The first is in the form of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI).  It is 
generally accepted that markets are a broad source of capital which 
can serve to kick-start a country‟s economy. However, the literature is 
undecided regarding the “real” benefits of FDI, other than the positive 
effects that FDI may have on the macroeconomic status of the host 
country (in terms of providing necessary foreign exchange), it is not 
clear as to why FDI is sometimes thought of as the “Holy Grail” of 
development (Zarsky and Gallagher, 2003).  Evidence from recent 
developments in Asia have shown that the reverse is actually true: it 
is rather economic development that attracts FDI (Chang 1998, 
Milberg 2003).  It can be argued that there is a mutually reinforcing 
relationship between the two.   It is however reasonable to assume 
                                            
46
 “The developmental state emphasises capacity to implement economic policies effectively.  Such a 
capacity is determined by such others – institutional, technical, administrative and political.  Undergirding 
all these is the autonomy of the state from social forces so that it can use these capacities to devise 
long-term economic policies unencumbered by claims of myopic private interests.  It is usually assumed 
that such a state should, in some sense, be strong and enjoy relative autonomy from key social actors” 
(Mkandawire, 1998). 
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that at some critical point, economic growth will not be possible 
without FDI, and FDI will not flow into a country without the 
reasonable expectation for economic growth.  By comparison, the 
vast majority of FDI flows today are between developed countries, 
with China attracting the majority of flows to developing countries, 
leaving very little to Africa and the remainder of the developing world.  
Future economic growth due to FDI will not only depend on the 
amount of FDI, but on some of the non-monetary benefits47 arising 
from FDI.  In this way FDI is very much like natural resources in that it 
is not the presence of FDI that will kick start the growth process, but it 
is rather how it is used which will be the determinant factor. 
 
Markets themselves can also be a useful mechanism for 
promoting transparency in an economy.  Due to the listing 
requirements of many of the world‟s largest stock exchanges, it is 
difficult for today‟s large multinational resource based companies to 
engage in corrupt or unethical activities for fear of being exposed.  
Consider the situation where a country is emerging from a resource 
boom period and is facing a balance of payments crises as it has 
over-extend itself.  In order to raise the necessary capital to pay off 
some of its debt, it chooses to privatise some of its parastatal mining 
                                            
47
 Non-monetary benefits arising out of FDI could include technology transfer, product diversification, 
employment, the transfers of management know-how etc.  In turn, the human capital stock of the host 
nation needs to be high enough to absorb these non-monetary benefits. 
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companies.  Whereas previous governments may quickly dispose of 
these assets to local political elites in return for support, a 
government that chooses the market approach will ensure that they 
are „at least‟ getting market value for their assets.  As in the recent 
case with the Societe Miniere de Bakwange (MIBA) of the DRC, the 
government invited applications from De Beers, BHP Billiton, Trans 
Hex and Dan Gertier International (DGI) to bid for 78,000 square 
kilometres of prospective diamond exploration territory.  Each 
company prepared very competitive offers for exclusive exploration 
rights to the land which is considered to be highly prospective.  In the 
end, the DRC decided that De Beers, BHP Billiton and DGI will have 
the rights to jointly prospect the land.  While now having raised 
sufficient funds, MIBA will be able to conduct exploration activities on 
the remaining 930,000 square kilometres of its concession (Katz, 
2004b).  Under such a strategy, if the long term goal of MIBA and the 
Government of the DRC is to rapidly expand its diamond sector, then 
utilising the private sector as a source of capital can assist in this 
objective. 
 
Another mechanism through which markets contribute to 
economic growth is through increased transparency led by initiatives 
such as the Publish What You Pay (PWYP) campaign (Palley 2003).  
The initiative proposes legislation requiring that publicly listed oil and 
mining companies disclose information about payments to 
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governments as a condition of stock exchange listing.  Through this 
system, anyone with access to the internet will quickly be able to see 
how much revenue natural resource companies have paid local 
governments.  It is hoped that such a campaign will assist in reducing 
corruption as it will provide a clear audit trail regarding how much 
money was received by government, by whom and for what.   
 
One of the weaknesses in the PWYP is that is does not go as far 
as to make the governments declare how much money they received, 
nor does it address the issue of state owned natural resource 
companies who may receive moneys from governments while also 
making payments.  In trying to fill this gap, the Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative (EITI) announced by Tony Blair at the 2002 
World Summit on Sustainable Development seeks to create voluntary 
compacts between governments and private industry regarding 
natural resource revenue transparency.  Under this framework, 
private companies are to disclose what they pay to governments, 
state owned companies will declare what they receive from 
governments and what they pay to government, while the 
government will declare what revenues they receive. 
 
Disclosure of payments in this fashion should render government 
officials more accountable and thus reduce corruption.  Investors and 
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citizens everywhere stand to benefit from PWYP and the EITI as 
reductions in corruption will stimulate investment and growth, as well 
as lowering the perception of political risk associated with the host 
nation (Palley, 2003).  
 
3.1.10 The structure of natural resource ownership and industrial 
policy 
Having now established the form of political system to be 
employed and the various requirements to create a deep functional 
democracy, the next question to answer when dealing with issues of 
natural resources is: What role should the government play in the 
extraction of these resources?  The structure of ownership is critical 
in understanding the resource curse as it will, in turn, determine the 
actions and roles of the key players (the entrepreneur, the market, 
the multinational corporations, multilateral institutions, the state, and 
labour).  As demonstrated by Luong and Weinthan (1999) and 
subsequently by Luong (2003), the role of the key players and hence 
the structure of natural resource48 ownership is dependant upon the 
interaction of two key variables: 
 
1. The availability of alternative sources of export revenue 
2. The level of political contestation. 
                                            
48
 In the case of Luong and Luong & Weinthal, their focus was primarily on oil as the natural resource in 
question.  Furthermore, their study focused primarily on Kazakhstan. 
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They argue that “the key to understanding why resource rich 
states share so many negative attributes is not their mineral wealth 
per se,… but whether the proceeds from resource extraction and 
exports are concentrated or dispersed.”  In their framework, proceeds 
which are concentrated would impoverish the state whereas better 
dispersal of the proceeds would enrich the state. 
 
In Luong‟s model, the availability of alternative sources of export 
revenue would mean that the state could postpone the development 
of its natural resources whilst maintaining its current levels of 
expenditure.  In this case a state with alternative sources of export 
revenue would seek to retain control over its reserves until the time 
suited it to develop them, whereas a state without outside sources of 
export revenue would be under pressure to develop its reserves.   
 
The level of political contestation on the other hand relates to the 
politico economy of the resource curse and determines the amount of 
resources that political leaders need in order to remain in power.  
“The more intense the challenge to maintaining the existing system 
for dispensing patronage… the greater the state leader‟s need to 
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attain additional resources49 to maintain power” (ibid).  As previously 
discussed, this is particularly true in Africa‟s developing economies 
where the emergence of a potential rival threatens the existing 
clientelist networks and systems of patronage upon which the 
economic and political systems are based. 
 
When natural resource ownership relates to land ownership, a 
different set of dynamics emerges.  In rural Africa, subsistence 
farming plays a fundamental contribution to people‟s health and well-
being, however in many countries, the plots are not registered in the 
farmer‟s names nor do many farmers have any registered assets to 
use as collateral.    This lack of assets poses a significant risk to their 
livelihood since in the case of a shock50, the farmer would have 
nothing to fall back on, no assets to sell, nothing to place against his 
name to secure a loan to wait out the drought as may be the case.  
Access to credit may also help farmers avoid the distress sale of 
assets and replace productive assets destroyed in the event of a 
disaster.  The key strength of microfinance however is in the 
knowledge that the money will be there in a time of need, which 
makes it possible for families to resist resorting to other less attractive 
strategies such as child labour (World Bank 2000).  Additional 
                                            
49
 In this case resources refers specifically to the means by which the leader will secure support. 
50
 A shock in this case could mean poor crop yield or a death in the family.  International crop prices are 
not as relevant for subsistence farming since little surplus is produced for export. 
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benefits to land tenure are related in the ability of a farmer to embark 
upon riskier ventures which could have higher payoffs for the farmer 
and the economy as a whole.  However these arguments are based 
upon the premise that a farmer is able to raise the credit against an 
asset.   
 
The problem of land registration / distribution is not easily solved. 
In the case where the land is already owned, it must now be re-
purchased by the state at market prices –a lengthy and costly 
exercise as demonstrated by South Africa‟s and Brazil‟s land reform 
programmes.  In the case where the land remains unregistered, the 
problem is compounded by the “reach” of the state and bureaucratic 
capacity.  The state many not have the capacity to survey and 
register all the new plots, nor may it even have a presence in the 
most remote areas of the country – with this in mind, it is also unlikely 
that financial institutions will be present in rural Africa any time soon.   
 
The issue of regulating small holdings for agricultural purposes is 
akin to the artisinal mining sector in much of Central and Western 
Africa.  In many of these instances the state lacks the capacity to 
regulate.  Many of the mining blocks remain unregistered, thereby 
hampering the states ability to collect tax revenue, gain knowledge of 
the deposit value, and enforce proper health and safety procedures.  
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From the perspective of the artisinal miner, a lack of state regulation 
and official access to markets increases the vulnerability of the miner 
to sell his product to buyers.  In the case of the artisinal diamond 
trade, the diamond dealers often control the local economy due to the 
socio-economic state of dependency of diamond diggers. 
 
As diamond diggers themselves do not typically have the 
resources available to finance their own development activities, so 
they look to financial sponsors who are able to advance them 
shovels, sieves and rice.  However, the price of such backing is high; 
the sponsors assume de facto control of the output.  In many cases, 
the livelihoods of extended family members of the diggers also 
depend on the largesse of the same sponsors, who extend credit to 
purchase the tools needed in another business, or the textiles and dry 
goods sold in another family business.  The miner must sell most or 
all of his production to his sponsor, who deducts real, but also 
additional “fabricated” costs, from the price paid to the miner.  The 
miner has little ability to influence price as upsetting the buyer may 
trigger economic catastrophe to the extended family. 
 
Often the diggers‟ and the licensed miners‟ only real chance to 
get a decent price for their winnings is to smuggle some of their 
diamonds out of the country.  This smuggling is not done to avoid 
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export taxes; it is the only means available to preserve the true value 
of production - by side-stepping the middlemen and sponsors. 
 
The financial return to the artisinal work force is often so meagre 
that the miner cannot be expected to make any significant tax 
contribution to the government, and his own ability to purchase goods 
or engage in commerce is severely constrained.  In many respects 
the mining communities are collectively bankrupt, with little or no 
means (either as a group or on an individual level) to spend beyond 
purchasing life-sustaining essentials for themselves and their 
families, and certainly not to invest or save.  This huge group and 
their dependents lack the requisites to contribute significantly to the 
domestic economy. 
 
In terms the structure of natural resource ownership in the 
formalised mining sector, western multilateral institutions have 
encouraged the privatisation of parastatal natural resource 
companies.  As per the Washington Consensus, the privatisation of 
state corporations is at the forefront of thought.  One such country 
which embarked on a massive privatisation of state assets post the 
adaptation of the consensus is Chile.  At the time of the Washington 
consensus, the Chilean government owned and mined much of the 
countries natural resources.   
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The degree of economic isolation followed by import-substitution 
industrialisation policies leads one to speculate that Chile had 
adopted a set of policies in accordance with dependency theory or 
world system theory.  The theories postulate that the wealthy nations 
of the world need a peripheral group of poorer states in order to 
remain wealthy.  These poor nations provide natural resources, 
cheap labour, a destination for obsolete technology, and markets to 
the wealthy nations, without which they could not have the standard 
of living they enjoy. First world nations actively, but not necessarily 
consciously, perpetuate a state of dependency through various 
policies and initiatives.  Very generally, some of the policy outcomes 
which a developing state may adopt to break free from the 
dependency theory are: 
 
 Promotion of domestic industry. By subsidising and protecting 
industries within the periphery nation, supposedly, these third-
world countries can produce their own products rather than 
simply export raw materials.  In the 1970s Chile embarked 
upon a massive campaign of import substitution 
industrialisation which it would hope would develop the 
secondary economy, gain skills and enable Chile to effectively 
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emerge into the world markets with a set of strong and 
competitive industries. 
 Import limitations. By limiting the importation of both luxury 
goods and manufactured goods that can be produced within 
the country, supposedly, the country can avoid having its 
capital and resources siphoned off.  
 Forbidding foreign investment. Some governments took steps 
to keep foreign companies and individuals from owning or 
operating property that draws on the resources of the country.  
 Nationalisation. Some governments have gone so far as to 
forcibly take over foreign-owned companies on behalf of the 
state, in order to keep profits within the country.  There is 
currently speculation that Venezuela is moving towards this 
direction as it has now required that all mining companies re-
apply for their mining rights. 
 
3.1.10.1 Case study: Chile 
Chile is an excellent case to study in order to glean deeper 
insight into the effects of industrial policy and the structure of 
resource ownership on economic growth.  Much of the historical 
insights are adopted from The Library of Congress - Country Studies 
and the CIA World Factbook, with the exception of the charts and 
data analysis which are based on the World Bank‟s world 
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development indices database and Chilean national accounts and 
trade statistics. 
 
The following chart (figure 3-8) depicts the historical composition 
of Chilean exports since 1960.  As can be seen (in 1998 terms), the 
absolute value of primary exports since 1960 has remained relatively 
stable.  The government attempted to diversify local manufacturing 
and adopted an import substitution industrialisation (ISI) policy 
stance.  As with most historical cases, Chile's import-substitution 
strategy was accompanied by an acute overvaluation of the domestic 
currency that precluded the development of a vigorous non-traditional 
(i.e. non-copper) export sector.  Although some agrarian reform was 
attempted, the government increasingly resorted to controlling 
agricultural prices in order to subsidise the urban working and middle 
classes.  The agricultural sector was particularly harmed by the 
overvaluation of Chile's currency.  The lagging of agriculture became, 
in fact, one of the most noticeable symptoms of Chile's economic 
problems of the 1950s and 1960s.  Over this period, manufacturing 
and mining, mainly of copper, significantly increased their shares in 
total output. 
 
By the early 1960s, most of the easy and obvious substitutions of 
imported goods had already been made; the process of import 
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substitution was rapidly becoming less dynamic. For example, 
between 1950 and 1960 total real industrial production grew at an 
annual rate of only 3.5 percent, less than half the rate of the previous 
decade.   
Chilean exports 1960 - 1994
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Figure 3-8 Historical composition of Chilean exports
51
 (Chilean national 
statistics) 
 
During the 1960s, and especially during the Frei administration, 
some efforts to reform the economy were launched.  These included 
agrarian reform, limited liberalisation of the external sector, and a 
policy of mini-devaluations aimed at preventing the erosion of the real 
exchange rate. Under the 1962 Agrarian Reform Law, the Agrarian 
Reform Corporation (Corporación de Reforma Agraria-Cora) was 
                                            
51
 It should be noted that although the Chilean government loosened its control of many of the natural 
resources since adopting the Washington Consensus, Chile retained its interest in Codelco – the 
Chilean copper mining parastatal which produces over 40% of the World‟s copper. 
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created to handle the land distribution programme, but land reform 
proved to be slow and expensive52. In spite of these and other 
reforms, toward the end of the 1960s it appeared that the 
performance of the economy had not improved in relation to the 
previous twenty years. Moreover, the economy was still heavily 
regulated.   (See figure 3-9.) 
 
In September 1970, Salvador Allende, the UP candidate, was 
elected president of Chile. Over the next three years, a unique 
political and economic experience followed. The UP was a coalition of 
left and centre-left parties dominated by the Socialist Party (Partido 
Socialista - PS) and the Communist Party of Chile (Partido 
Comunista de Chile - PCCh), both of which sought to implement deep 
institutional, political, and economic reforms. The ruling socialist-
communist Popular Unity‟s (Unidad Popular--UP) program called for 
a democratic "Chilean road to socialism" 
 
When Allende took office in November 1970, his UP government 
faced a stagnant economy weakened by inflation, which hit a rate of 
35 percent in 1970. Between 1967 and 1970, real GDP per capita 
had grown only 1.2 percent per annum, a rate significantly below the 
Latin American average. The balance of payments had shown 
                                            
52
 Land reform has since had similar experiences in Brazil and South Africa. 
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substantial surpluses during all but one of the years from 1964 to 
1970, and, at the time the UP took power, the Central Bank of Chile 
had a stock of international reserves of approximately US$400 
million. 
 
The UP had a number of short-run economic objectives: initiating 
structural economic transformations, including a program of 
nationalisation53; increasing real wages; reducing inflation; spurring 
economic growth; increasing consumption, especially by poorer 
people; and reducing the economy's dependence on the rest of the 
world.  In the area of structural reforms, two basic reforms were 
immediately implemented.  First, agrarian reform was greatly 
intensified, and a large number of farms were expropriated.  Second, 
the government proposed to change the constitution in order to 
nationalise the large copper mines, which were jointly owned by large 
United States firms and the Chilean state.  The remainder of the UP's 
nationalisation program was to be achieved by a combination of new 
legislation, requisitions, and stock purchases from small 
shareholders.  The other goals (output and increased consumption, 
with rising salaries and declining inflation) were to be accomplished 
by a boost in aggregate demand, mainly generated by higher 
                                            
53
 This had a profound and lasting effect on the natural resource sector and specifically on the structure 
of ownership of natural resources. 
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government expenditures, accompanied by strict price controls and 
measures to redistribute income.   
 
The UP's macroeconomic program was based on several key 
assumptions, the most important being that the manufacturing sector 
had ample underutilised capacity.  This provided the theoretical basis 
for the belief that large fiscal deficits would not necessarily be 
inflationary. The lack of full utilisation was, in turn, attributed to two 
fundamental factors: the monopolistic nature of the manufacturing 
industry and the structure of income distribution. Based on this 
diagnosis, it was thought that if income were redistributed toward the 
poorer groups through wage increases and if prices were properly 
controlled, there would be a significant expansion of demand and 
output. 
 
The UP perspective on the way the economy functioned ignored 
many of the key principles of traditional economic theory.  In this 
respect Chile‟s policy stances do not differ greatly from those of the 
developmental state in East Asia.  However, the principle difference 
lies in that Asia was focused primarily on developing export-led 
growth through competition with the global economy, while Chile‟s 
focus was more internal.  Chile‟s policies greatly diminished the 
attention given to monetary policies, and a complete disregard of the 
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exchange rate as a key variable in determining a macroeconomic 
equilibrium.  In particular, the UP programme and policies paid no 
attention to the role of the real exchange rate as a determinant of the 
country's international competitive position.  Moreover, the UP failed 
to recognise that its policies would not be sustainable in the medium 
term and that capacity constraints were going to become an 
insurmountable obstacle to rapid growth. 
 
After the military took over the government in September 1973, a 
period of dramatic economic changes began. Chile was transformed 
gradually from an economy isolated from the rest of the world, with 
strong government intervention, into a liberalised, world-integrated 
economy, where market forces were left free to guide most of the 
economy's decisions. This period was characterised by several 
important economic achievements: inflation was reduced greatly, the 
government deficit was virtually eliminated, the economy went 
through a dramatic liberalisation of its foreign sector, and a strong 
market system was established. 
 
From an economic point of view, the era of General Augusto 
Pinochet Ugarte (1973-90) can be divided into two periods. The first, 
from 1973 to 1982, corresponds to the period when most of the 
reforms were implemented.  The period ended with the international 
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debt crisis and the collapse of the Chilean economy.  During this 
period, a pragmatic economic policy that emphasised export 
expansion and growth was implemented.  The second period, from 
1982 to 1990, is characterised by economic recovery and the 
consolidation of the free-market reforms.  This eventually led to the 
implementation of the Washington consensus. 
 
The following chart (figure 3-9) of Chile‟s national accounts 
statistics shows the performance of the overall economy over the 
same time period as figure 3-8, but in 1995 terms.  As can be seen 
the economy only started to achieve high growth figures post 1984.  
This date aligns with Pinochet‟s free market reforms and Chile‟s 
adoption of the Washington Consensus which can be indicative of 
two possible developmental paths:  
 
1. The increase in GDP and GDP per capital was due to a 
loosening of government involvement in the run-up to 
adopting the Washington consensus, thereafter the 
consensus policies continued to be beneficial for the 
Chilean economy.  This argument would support the neo-
classical and neo-liberal economic view which states that 
in order to achieve economic growth the role of the state 
should be limited. 
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2. Given that high growth rates were achieved immediately 
following Chile‟s import substitution and “anti-
dependency theory” policies suggests that this policy set 
was appropriate over the 1970s and gave Chile the 
correct skills to diversify away from natural resource 
dependency. 
Chile - National Account Statistics (1960-2003)
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Figure 3-9 Chilean economic growth and copper price (1960-2003, source: 
World Bank Development Indicators) 
 
When closely examining figure 3-8 in conjunction with figure 3-9, 
one can extend the following conclusion:  In the period post the 
Washington consensus, Chile achieved growth away from its natural 
resource sector.  Secondly although forced beneficiation of natural 
resources (through ISI) predates the massive growth periods 
experienced in the mid 80s until this day, the exports of beneficiated 
goods quickly ceased to „pre‟ import-substitution levels after the 
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adoption of the Washington consensus.  Chile shifted focus from its 
“comparative” advantages in making products from copper and other 
nationally mined products to strategically identified “competitive” 
advantages.  These competitive advantages, in strategically identified 
sectors, are the driving factor behind Chilean growth in the post-
consensus years.  As can be seen in figure 3-8, it is the “other” 
exports which continue to grow and not the beneficiated or primary 
mineral exports54.  
 
Chile‟s case contains many important policy lessons for other 
countries considering the forced development of beneficiated 
products from a comparative advantage in natural resources.  In 
Chile‟s case these policies were unsustainable and cost more than 
they benefited the nation55 (Martin, 2005).  In the end, the Chilean 
economy only experienced rapid economic growth once more liberal 
policies were implemented and other strategic sectors of the 
economy identified for growth.  Developing countries should rather 
specifically target strategic sectors and nurture these.  The industrial 
policy set adopted by Asian countries in recent years to achieve high 
rates of economic growth is very similar to the Chilean case but there 
                                            
54
 In Chile‟s case, the „other‟ exports include an increase in aquatic and agricultural products, in addition 
to manufactured products. 
55
 The costs are greater than the benefits since government reallocates tax and other revenue from 
competitive sectors to grant subsidies to infant industries to develop.  Meanwhile, import tariffs are 
increased on foreign goods which can lead to inflation and to higher costs for local industries – rendering 
them even more uncompetitive. 
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exists one major difference.  Because of the low natural resource 
base of Asian countries, they did not have the opportunity to develop 
their comparative advantages into competitive advantages.  From 
commencement of their development strategy, they had to adopt 
policies which targeted strategically important industries for growth.  
In essence, Asia had an interventionist approach but intervened to 
seeking a competitive advantage – not to make the most out of its 
natural endowments. 
 
The following simplified example illustrates how import 
substitution industrialisation and forced beneficiation leaves a sector 
uncompetitive, costs more than the benefit and can create an 
environment of rent-seeking to keep the uncompetitive sector afloat.  
Rent-seeking may begin due to a 
need to subsidise policies.  I.e. the 
Chilean Government may seek more 
taxes from the mining sector.
Market
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Figure 3-10 Import substitution, forced beneficiation and rent-seeking 
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Consider the following scenario, Chile and Country “X” both wish 
to manufacture widgets from copper.  Widgets in this example are 
made solely from copper, and Chile, as the major producer of copper, 
believes that for this reason it would be beneficial to take over the 
widget industry.  Currently, a batch of widgets requires 1t of copper 
and a batch consists of 1000 widgets.  The cost of shipping copper to 
Country “X” is very low at 1 $/t of copper.  Country “X” has a relatively 
weak exchange rate in comparison to Chile which is making Country 
“X” very competitive.  In addition to this country “X” has been making 
copper widgets for a long time and already has all the necessary 
skills and infrastructure to do so efficiently.  For each widget 
produced, Country “X” only has additional costs per widget of $15.  
This includes all other inputs required, excluding the cost of copper 
and shipping – which is calculated separately.  Chile, on the other 
hand has operating costs of $20 per widget – due to perhaps more 
stringent labour laws and a strong exchange rate.   
 
In determining how competitive Chile is at producing widgets in 
comparison to Country “X”, Chile can produce a batch of widgets for 
$21,000 whereas Country “X” can produce a batch for $16,001.   
Therefore, for Chile to compete with Country “X”, the Chilean 
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government needs to subsidise the widget factory by a total of $4,999 
per batch of widgets. 
 
After 5 years in making widgets, the additional $4,999 comes as 
a drain to the Chilean fiscus.  The government did not expect to have 
to subsidise so much and for so long.  The government considers 
removing the subsidies, but this is met with opposition from populist 
groups such as unions and the political elite who are benefiting from 
the subsidies.  Therefore, the state has little recourse but to rent-seek 
and increase the taxes and royalties on the mining industry (which is 
producing the copper required for the widget factories).  Those mining 
companies that are privatised complain to the government.  Due to 
the fixed nature of the mines, the multinationals realise they have little 
power to negotiate as they cannot move the mine into a „friendlier‟ 
country.  In the end, the mining sector is actually subsidising the 
Chilean widget factories.  Due to the additional costs, owing to the 
subsidies and increased costs of ore extraction over the life of mine, 
copper reserves may be revised downwards.  If reserves are largely 
rendered uneconomic, the Chilean widget factories will need to close 
since they are even more uncompetitive if they are required to source 
copper on the international market. 
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As can be seen from this example, the Chilean widget factories 
are only as sustainable as the Chilean coppers reserves.  This leads 
one to conclude that a „forced‟ economy based on local natural 
endowments is as finite as the reserves themselves. 
 
3.1.10.2 Chilean lessons applied to South African diamond 
beneficiation 
The scenario above holds important lessons applicable in the 
South African context with its many development objectives.  South 
Africa‟s developmental state, rooted in a mixed economy56 can be 
said to be somewhat influenced by the dependency theory of 
economics.  The state very much still has a hand in the economy and 
is using its influence to achieve its broader development objectives.  
As such, the legislation governing the minerals sector is being 
adapted to align itself with government objectives.  Some of the new 
mineral policies include, but are not limited to a new mining charter 
(linked to socio-economic development plans), a new ad valorem 
royalty and most recently the diamond amendment bill57.  The 
                                            
56
 The ownership structure of enterprises in South Africa is very much a mixture of private and state 
owned enterprises - hence the economy is termed „mixed‟. 
57
 The diamond amendment bill once implemented will increase the government control of all diamonds 
produced in the country.  The bill removes the right of the mining company to market its product and 
envisages the state playing a critical role of allocating resources (diamonds) to many small, black 
economically empowered companies.  Through this mechanism of reallocation the government seeks to 
increase beneficiation thereby increasing the value of the final exported product as well as develop skills 
in the diamond cutting and polishing sectors.   
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diamond amendment bill is specifically of interest when examining the 
case of Chile and its import substitution/beneficiation campaigns. 
 
Whereas in the previous hypothetical example, Chile identified 
the manufacturing of “widgets” as a good industry to develop because 
Chile mined copper, South Africa is attempting to force58 the 
beneficiation of diamonds because it mines them.  As was shown in 
figures 3-8 and 3-9, induced beneficiation did not work for Chile and 
there is at this stage little evidence to suggest that South Africa‟s 
approach will be more successful in creating a sustainable diamond 
cutting and polishing sector given the marginal nature of South 
Africa‟s diamond mines.  In 2004, 5 out of the 7 De Beers mines were 
running at a loss – which comprises the bulk of South African 
diamond production.  Considering that the majority of the mines are 
scheduled to be depleted by approximately 2015, large quantities of 
capital need to be injected into the mines‟ infrastructure in order 
sustain current levels of production.  The royalty bill and the export 
duty envisaged by the diamond amendment bill will increase the cost 
of production and reduce the reserve base of the mines – it will also 
jeopardise the envisaged returns on the mine extension projects and 
render some of these unfeasible.   
                                            
58
 In this case, „force‟ is the applicable term since South Africa will not induce companies to move 
beneficiation centres to South Africa but will instead allocate all mined diamonds to a state diamond 
bourse for reallocation to cutters.  All rough diamonds exported will attract a 15% export duty. 
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There is the possibility that these additional “costs” will be pushed 
downstream to the market in the form of price and that the mines may 
be able to continue to plan on current revenues.  If price is pushed 
onto the consumers, the markets will only absorb additional price if 
there is a shortage of supply in relation to demand and if price 
elasticity is relatively weak59. 
 
 South African diamond cutters are not competitive in all the 
various grades of diamonds60.  To further complicate the matter, the 
mix of South African goods positions South African cutters at a 
disadvantage in comparison with Eastern cutting and polishing 
manufacturing firms.  Given the current uncertainties in the industry 
regarding the threat of synthetic diamonds, the possibility of a future 
U.S. recession, slower or stagnant growth in India, China and Japan 
and increased volatility in diamond price due to the liberalisation of 
De Beers‟ grip on the industry, natural price cycles and price volatility 
can be expected to increase.  These natural cycles will likely, from 
time to time, render certain cutters uneconomic.  In the case of 
diamond supply exceeding demand, the South African diamond 
                                            
59
 Currently this is seen to be the case. 
60
 South African cutting factories are only competitive in the larger and more valuable goods.  India is 
predominantly the most competitive country in the smaller size fractions and lower quality goods. 
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bourse may be required to stockpile diamonds.61  If such a situation 
arises, this additional working capital will need to be funded by the 
state or the bourse itself.  In turn, this form of subsidy will come at a 
cost to the South African government.   
 
The case of South African diamond beneficiation can be seen 
akin to Chile‟s widget factories.  The “subsidies” in this case would 
refer specifically to either propping up inexperienced South African 
cutting and polishing businesses, as well as unexpected working 
capital requirements in the face of price cycles.  The other costs to 
South Africans will be in the form of lower taxable profits from the 
mines, reduced investment in the mining industry due to: reduced 
returns and potentially higher perceptions of political risk; reduced 
reserves and therefore reduced sustainability of the communities 
where mining currently takes place; and finally reduced financial 
stimulus of linkages between the mining industry and other 
businesses due to a shortened mining life. 
 
Although the government‟s objectives are to create employment 
through its natural endowments, the current anti-dependency theory 
position of the South African government and its many policy 
implications may come as a greater cost to the South African 
                                            
61
 As the South African diamond cutters will produce at higher prices, jewellery manufactures and 
consumers will first purchase lower priced goods from more competitive markets. 
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economy than a benefit.  A recent study commissioned by South 
Africa‟s Nedlac (National Economic Development & Labour Council) 
found that “promoting beneficiation would be achieved at a relatively 
higher cost than intervention in other sectors. The researchers 
recommended that “great care” be taken in “expending resources on 
intervening in the sector as returns may be limited” (Goldman, 2005). 
 
The motivations for pursuing such policies in the face of industry 
and technocratic opposition are many.  Perhaps most significantly, 
government motives are likely heavily influenced the political 
economic situation in South Africa.  The current ruling party (the 
ANC) has not delivered economic reform, growth, opportunities, 
distribution of wealth and equality in the rates expected by the 
majority of South Africans since the ANC took power in 1994.  The 
government‟s underperformance may be posing a threat to its 
legitimacy.  Although well isolated due to a clear electoral majority in 
parliament, the pressure from civil action groups and populist 
movements may be forcing the South African government to adopt 
centralist policies in order to deliver on its previous promises 
timeously before the next set of elections for as Kohli (1993) notes, 
“the gap between expectations and the reform-induced reality 
exacerbates the problems of managing fragile new democracies.” 
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Much of the literature and previous case studies suggests that 
when considering the development of secondary industries, 
developing countries should rather take a blank page approach.  A 
rich base of natural endowments is not necessarily easily converted 
into a competitive advantage and therefore is not necessarily on the 
road to competitive and sustainable economic development.   Control 
of natural endowments are however the easier route – since the far 
more difficult task of converting an uncompetitive economy into a 
competitive economy can be temporarily avoided.  Using the natural 
resources and adopting interventionist state policies may temporarily 
maintain or even elevate current income levels, however as natural 
resources are finite, so is an economy which is dependant upon 
them.  This problem is at the core of the resource curse.  It has been 
argued by many in economic circles that one of the reasons natural 
resource rich countries fail to develop competitive economies in 
comparison to resource poor countries is simply because they have 
the natural resources which allows them to delay the application of 
appropriate competitive growth policies (Kim, 1998; Martin, 2005; 
Auty 1990; Ross, 2005c).   In summary, there is a certain element of 
distraction associated with being resource rich which drives the 
postponement of appropriate policies aimed at industrialisation and 
economic development.  
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When forming the basis of industrial policy and the type of 
government intervention, a nation should rather strategically 
determine sectors from which to specialise and become globally 
competitive.  A blank page approach is appropriate when determining 
opportunities to develop secondary industries.  Countries should 
strategically identify industries based on a competitive basis and not 
on comparative advantage terms.  As was shown with the case of 
Chile, it was not the forced beneficiation which drove Chile‟s GDP per 
capital growth, but it was rather the development of the economy 
away from mineral beneficiation which is responsible.  However this 
is not to say that a country should turn a blind eye to its natural 
resources.  As shown later in this paper, natural resource wealth 
forms the basis for the current standard of living, and maintains this 
standard until development through economic diversification is 
achieved.   
 
3.1.11 Room for the developmental state and transitional 
institutions 
Due to the emerging nature of developing economies, many of 
the basic services of the state have not yet been developed for 
complete market economies to function perfectly.  In these „mixed‟ 
economies there is still very much a role for the state to play in 
stimulating economic growth.   Markets will not tend to naturally fill 
the vacuum of these economies and need to be induced to 
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participate.  However the manner in which markets participate must 
also be guided by the state.  The state and market will be intertwined; 
the market will carry out many of the functions of development, while 
the state will set the playing field and give guidance and incentives 
through various forms of industrial policy.  For such an economy to 
function, the state must be embedded in the economy.  However, in 
order to make the long term policy choices required, the state must 
be somewhat isolated from populist pressures.  This form of state has 
come to be known as “embedded autonomy” or the “developmental 
state”.   
 
“The developmental state emphasises capacity to implement 
economic policies effectively.  Such a capacity is determined by such 
others – institutional, technical, administrative and political.  
Undergirding all these is the autonomy of the state from social forces 
so that it can use these capacities to devise long-term economic 
policies unencumbered by claims of myopic private interests.  It is 
usually assumed that such a state should, in some sense, be strong 
and enjoy relative autonomy from key social actors” (Mkandawire, 
1998).  As in the case of both East Asia and Chile, the developmental 
state takes much of its shape through the type of industrial policies it 
implements.  Accordingly a few of the most advocated reasons of the 
need for industrial policy in developing countries are: 
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1. The protection of local companies 
2. The socialisation of risk 
3. The presence of market failures  
The market plays an equally significant role in the developmental 
state.  There is a strong case for a balance between state 
intervention and market forces.  The market provides the natural 
incentives which the state cannot, and the state, on the other hand, 
provides those basic services and frameworks upon which markets 
rely to function properly.  This balance is briefly illustrated by 
returning at the end of this section to the case of Chile in comparison 
with East Asia.     
3.1.11.1 Protection of local companies 
 “[P]ioneering technology was the crux of the competitiveness of 
leading enterprises” (Amsden, 1994).  Although initially direct 
competition in Asia was sought through low wages due either to 
relaxed labour laws or due to the setting of the exchange rate, it was 
hoped that this alone could attract foreign investment and “wrest 
away market share from industrialised nations” (ibid).  However, over 
time low wages are “no match for the higher productivity of more 
industrialised countries” (ibid).  Given this outcome and the fact that 
most transnational corporations are subject to a home bias, the future 
industrialisation of developing countries becomes increasing bleak 
since the developing country will not ever develop its own local 
solution to enhanced competitiveness. 
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The protection of local companies or infant industries can be 
regarded as direct interference by the State to try and position the 
local industry in some kind of middle ground.  This can be 
accomplished through regulating a maximum amount of foreign 
ownership and control, offering less regulatory requirements to locally 
owned companies, specialised incentives to start-ups, specialised 
grants and tax write-offs for local R&D, as well as other policy 
instruments which may act as a deterrent to investment by foreign 
firms such as limitations to the repatriation of profits, etc.   
 
In essence, the protection of local industries creates local 
expertise and local talent within the developing nation.  It allows 
industries to mature and then develop their own techniques which will 
give them a unique competitive edge in the international market 
place. 
 
3.1.11.2 The socialisation of risk 
“The capitalist economy has developed on the basis of the 
growing socialisation of risk”, Chang (1994).  “The West has grown 
rich, by comparison to other economies, by allowing its economic 
sector the autonomy to experiment in the development of new and 
diverse products, methods of [manufacturing,….]  and relations 
between capital and labour” (ibid).  Chang argues that because the 
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state could act in such a way that it internalised the benefits but 
externalised the risks, it “allowed risk-taking beyond a scale whose 
risk can personally be borne out by the experimenter.”   
 
The socialisation of risk can therefore be seen as an institutional 
arrangement since it is comprised of the host of incentives62, 
disincentives and protectionist policies which make up the investment 
environment pertinent to the particular enterprise. 
 
3.1.11.3 The presence of market failures 
Amsden (1994) and Chang (1994) both mention the failure of the 
market as a need for industrial policies.  Chang has the view that 
industrial policy has a strong role to play when it comes to the 
problem of coordination.   “Firms [are] islands of planned economy in 
the capitalist sea of anarchy.”  Each company has a limited view on 
information and each must strive to be the leading firm.  Due to 
production economies of scale, the more units that Company A can 
deliver the less will be its cost per unit since a large degree of each 
firm‟s costs are fixed and sunk.  Therefore if Company B cannot 
produce units for less than Company A, it will eventually be driven out 
of the market.  Eventually, “the outcome is an oligopolistic industry in 
                                            
62
 Bankruptcy protection and social nets are institutional arrangements that allow for greater risk-taking in 
the economy. 
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which strategic interdependence among the decisions of the firms 
exist.”  (ibid.) 
 
In a developing economy where local capital for investment is 
scarce, it becomes wasteful for too many companies to compete 
against each other, only to be left with a few remaining companies.  
Some coordination is preferred since then each company can focus 
on different national industrial requirements.  For this reason, 
governments in East Asia limited new entrants in specific sectors to 
allow local companies the freedom to focus solely on competition with 
foreign companies. 
 
Amsden (1994) describes the failure of market forces in the way 
in which they will relate to subsidised firms.  “Market forces cannot be 
relied upon to discipline business to act efficiently.”  It is doubtful 
whether subsidised firms have the motivation to invest heavily in 
R&D, reduce costs and improve efficiencies in order to subsequently 
improve competitiveness. “Subsidy recipients, therefore must be 
disciplined, or the prognosis for sustained industrial development is 
dim: a continuation of subsidies to inefficient firms (inefficient by 
comparison with the world frontier), or de-industrialisation and 
unemployment as subsidies are retired.”  Amsden clearly sees the 
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state playing the role of disciplinarian in an environment where 
subsidies may create market distortions. 
 
3.1.11.4 The interaction between the market and the 
developmental state 
Although the government is a key role player in an economy led 
by a developmental state, the market is equally a significant player.  
As many of the government‟s policy recommendations rely heavily 
upon market mechanisms to drive investor decision making, the two 
(market and state) are interconnected.   
 
As previously discussed, many economists advocate that a more 
non-interventionist state is the better one, however as demonstrated 
in the recent discussion, there is a real need for interference by the 
State from time to time as markets are not perfect – especially when 
one economy is at a disadvantage to another.  It is rather how this 
intervention is carried out that is crucial.  “The consequences of state 
intervention depend on what kind of intervention is attempted by what 
kind of state and in what context” (Evans, 1995b). 
 
Evans (1995b) expands upon the concept of “embedded 
autonomy” which not only alludes to the relationship between the 
state and society but also about the structure of the state itself.  The 
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state must be embedded in order for the state to be more responsive 
to entrepreneurial endeavours.  “Entrepreneurship must be 
selectively stimulated, complemented, and reinforced.  This in turn 
demands more intimate connections to private economic agents, a 
state that is more „embedded‟ in society than insulated from it.”  
When Evans discusses „autonomy‟ it is specifically in the manner in 
which the state responds to the needs of the economy.  Autonomy 
also has much to do with the structure of the state and the way in 
which representatives of the state benefit from the state‟s interaction 
with the economy.  The most suitable state structure to suit capitalism 
and the market economy is bureaucracy even though there are 
numerous challenges associated with building a functioning 
bureaucracy in the third world (ibid).  The challenge herewith is the 
degree of insulation from the bureaucracy‟s interaction with the 
economy.  Weber (cited in Evans 1995b) believes that “insulation 
from democracy [is] a necessary pre-condition for a functioning 
bureaucracy.”  “The kind of coherent, cohesive bureaucracy that is 
postulated in the Weberian hypothesis must have a certain degree of 
autonomy vis-à-vis society.  The problem is separating the benefits of 
insulation from the costs of isolation” (Evans, 1995b).  There is a 
balancing act that must take place to ensure that the relationship 
between „embeddedness‟ and „autonomy‟ are most effectively 
combined. 
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Further to the role of the State, in the state-market relationship, 
the correct level of “embedded autonomy” will be required for the 
state to act simultaneously as incubator and disciplinarian of industry.  
An incubator in the sense that the state is required to grow the 
domestic industrial base, and a disciplinarian in the sense that the 
state must keep those subsidised industries competitive in the 
international market place. 
 
3.1.11.5 Returning to the cases of Chile and East Asia 
Although immediate liberalisation of the economy post import 
substitutions industrialisation policies, and adopting market based 
institutions may have demonstrated fair results for Chile.63  There still 
remains room for the concept of the developmental state and 
transitional institutions, especially in Africa.  Palma (2003) suggests 
that the history of poor development in Latin America is partly due to 
the “extreme form in which [new ideologies were] taken up”, implying 
that one cannot simply jump from a set of ideologies (or development 
path) to another without carefully mapping the path and 
complementing it in turn with the nation‟s natural endowments and 
institutions.  Palma further suggests that “Latin America [may be] in 
                                            
63
 Although Chile‟s development path may have shown good results in terms of export diversification and 
GDP growth, Chile‟s performance is often understood as a “complicated case”.  Chile has experienced 
wide scale macro-economic instability due to external shocks as well as balance of payments issues 
with its import substitution industrialisation policies.  However as far as the role of macro-economic 
stability in economic development, East Asian countries (as did Chile) put a prime focus on industrial 
upgrading and not macro-economic stability (Chang, 2003c).  
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desperate need of a touch of East Asian Confucianism; i.e. once a 
development path has been chosen, a significant degree of 
persistence, pragmatism, effective leadership and self-respect can be 
of great assistance in policymaking.”  
 
The East Asian experience64 uses the developmental state 
primarily to emphasise Japanese-style strategic industrial policy.  
When a late-industrialised country wishes to emerge and compete 
globally, market mechanisms are not enough, especially in industries 
that require a high level of skills and capital investment, “governments 
have to intervene and deliberately distort prices to stimulate 
investment and trade.  Otherwise industrialisation won‟t germinate” 
(Amsden, 1994).  
 
The East Asian countries all promoted industries with high growth 
potential and widespread externalities through an array of means, 
which included: infant industry protection; export subsidies, including 
tariff rebates on imported inputs used for exports; coordination of 
complementary investments; regulation of firm entry, exit, 
investments, and pricing intended to „manage competition‟; subsidies 
and restriction of competition intended to help technology upgrading 
(Chang, 2003c).  The focus of these countries was primarily on 
                                            
64
 By East Asia, attention is specifically drawn to Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and 
Singapore 
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promoting industries with the vision of making them competitive 
globally.  There was also an understanding that the only way that this 
could happen was to offer some initial protection linked to exports 
performance.  As the goal is to eventually eliminate the infant industry 
protection, the sector enjoying the protection will need to eventually 
be self-reliant.  In comparison to the import substitution 
industrialisation policies of Chile, an export focused industrialisation 
programmed is far more effective since a focus on ultimate global 
competition forces industry to learn - with the state acting as 
incubator and disciplinarian.  Under an export industrialisation 
strategy a country will not only experience benefits of “learning-by-
doing” but also benefits through “learning-by-exporting” whilst limiting 
its exposure to a „subsidisation trap‟. 
 
Many nations put a great deal of faith in new sets of institutions 
and expect that policy makers and government officials can now rest 
while the institutions and reforms will do the work.  This position 
places too much faith on institutions alone.  Institutions, like an 
endowment of natural resources are simply a tool, they are part of the 
developmental state‟s plan and they must support the plan and be 
identified through the plan.  A Washington Consensus type of 
approach will likely not work on its own.  A nation must take 
cognisance of its economic history, its stock of social capital, its 
capacity to govern and a variety of other factors before it can adopt a 
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set of institutions to support its development objectives.  As the nation 
progresses along its developmental path, the institutions will need to 
be modified to suit the changing needs of the economy and society.  
Latin America put too much faith in new ideologies and switched very 
quickly from closed economies to open economies while some have 
now gone back to closed economies in a matter of mere decades.  
Lack of continuity between the previous economy and the new 
economy could be one possible explanation for Latin America‟s 
„stumblings‟.  Countries wishing to change development trajectories 
should realise the need for transitional institutions.  Moreover, 
Western countries and multilaterals should also appreciate this 
requirement and not too forcefully impose structural changes at an 
inappropriate pace. 
 
3.2 The human capital paradigm and social capital outcomes 
One of the areas poorly addressed in literature is the effect of 
natural resources on human capital.  Human capital typically refers to 
peoples‟ skills and abilities as used in employment and how they 
otherwise contribute to the economy.  A country‟s human capital 
stock therefore is comprised of the population‟s level of educational 
attainment (its skills and knowledge base) as well as measures of its 
mortality rates (its health status). 
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Although poorly covered within the framework of the resource 
curse, human capital has long been identified as a critical issue for 
economic development.  The millennium development goals for 
example are heavily geared towards the improvement of human 
capital. 
1. Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger
2. Achieve universal primary education
3. Promote gender equality and empower women
4. Reduce child mortality
5. Improve maternal health
6. Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases
7. Ensure environmental sustainability
8. Develop a global partnership for development  
Figure 3-11 UN millennium development goals 
As human capital accumulation is critical for economic 
development, it is of great importance to understand the effect of 
natural resources on human capital accumulation.  The question at 
stake is: Do natural resource abundant countries tend to accumulate 
more or less human capital than resource-poor countries?  
 
According to Stijns (2004) human capital is essential for 
economic development because “education permanently increases 
the efficiency of the labour force by fostering democracy65, and that 
human capital facilitates the absorption of superior technologies from 
                                            
65
 This could likely be through a greater understanding of society and its role in democracy.  For example 
there may be a critical level of education required to understand the economy, its place in the global 
arena and making informed electoral decisions.  Furthermore the argument also runs in the other 
direction – that a higher level of education amongst the populace will lead to an increasing desire to be 
control in one‟s own future and hence greater participation in decision making.   
There is evidently a link between human capital accumulation and social capital.  This link will be 
discussed in greater detail in the following sub-section. 
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leading countries.”  This point is important not only because it creates 
a natural link between human capital and social capital, but also 
because it captures the essence of current trade theory and 
Schumpeterian economics.  The interrelation to social capital will be 
described in a latter section, but for now it of benefit to briefly discuss 
the ability of economies with high levels of human capital to absorb 
technologies. 
 
Modern trade theory rests on the assumption that each country 
has a comparative advantage in trade in relation to the rest of the 
world.  Free trade is positioned from the point of view that a reduction 
of tariffs and liberalisation of trade will allow the specialisation of 
countries to take place.  Whilst this is important, the specialisation in 
trade is dependant upon the absorption of new technologies and 
management practices to render a particular sector competitive.  
Hence, the higher level of human capital in a country the more readily 
new technologies will be accepted and adopted.  Schumpeterian 
thought complements this in that his theory of economic development 
rests in innovation.  He postulates that without innovation eventually 
an economy would stagnate and that technological progress brought 
about by an increase in knowledge is the driving factor behind 
economic growth.  Hence, the lower the human capital base, the 
lesser the knowledge, the less innovation finally resulting in reduced 
growth. 
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Given that it is naturally well accepted that a high level of 
education is important for economic development, developing 
countries and specifically resource-rich countries should allocate a 
great deal of financial resources to elevating levels of human capital. 
 
3.2.1.1 Natural resources and human capital 
In specifically examining the role of natural resources in 
developing human capital, Gylfason (2001b) shows that public 
expenditure on education relative to national income, expected years 
of schooling for girls, and gross secondary enrollment are all 
inversely related to the share of natural capital in national wealth 
across countries. He concludes that natural resources appear to 
crowd out human capital, thereby slowing down the pace of economic 
development.  Gylfason asserts that “nations that are confident that 
their natural resources are their most important asset may 
inadvertently – and perhaps even deliberately! – neglect the 
development of their [other] resources, by devoting inadequate 
attention and expenditure to education.”  
 
The research is however not unified in its conclusions, as Davis 
(1995) finds that human capital accumulation indicators tend to be 
higher in mineral countries than in non-mineral countries.  The 
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differences in conclusions may however lie in the data being 
analysed.  Where Gylfason included measures of agriculture in his 
definition of resource-rich, Davis limited the analysis to minerals when 
referring to natural resources.  Stijns (2004) is doubtful as to whether 
the role played in economic development by the agricultural sector is 
similar to that played by the minerals sector.  This lumping of differing 
sectors is widespread as many of the studies carried out on the 
resource curse tend to lump the two sectors together -including the 
leading papers by Sachs and Warner, 1995, 1997 & 2001.   
 
The above studies focus purely on the quantum of human capital 
as measured by levels of educational attainment of public 
expenditure figures.  It is important to however distinguish between 
quantity of human capital measured by these indices and quality of 
human capital.  Furthermore, there may be differences in the „type‟ or 
„structure‟ of human capital between resource-rich and poor nations.   
Kim (1998) finds that resource rich countries tend to have high levels 
of certain specific human capital and relatively low levels of general 
human capital.  According to Kim, specific human capital represents 
specific skills, and the level of general human capital is related to the 
adaptability or flexibility of economic agents, which in turn lowers the 
cost of moving to more productive or technology intensive sectors. 
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In Kim‟s model, a low level of general human capital is related to 
inflexibility of human capital.  i.e. a mining nation would find it difficult 
to embrace other sectors due to its deep and specific mining skills.  
This inability to „swing‟ between sectors can be seen as a cost to 
diversifying an economy.  As described previously, the current levels 
of high mineral wealth enjoyed by resource-rich countries can induce 
governments to postpone a transition to higher productivity, higher 
return activities.  “The reform of Latin American economies was 
blocked because the deployment of revenues from their primary 
products had initially been too successful in raising living standards 
and labour cost…. [By] the time the limits to the primary sector‟s 
capacity to generate foreign exchange became apparent, the cost of 
making the required switch to a competitive industrial policy (which 
[is] necessarily based upon low-wage manufactured exports) were 
too high. ... [this] argument is a variant of the resource curse thesis 
which suggests that resource rich countries may squander their 
resource advantage because an overly optimistic estimation of their 
prospects reads to the pursuit of lax economic policies.  A corollary is 
that resource-poor countries, mindful of their marginal position, may 
compensate for their disadvantage by adopting firmer and more far-
sighted policies” (Kim, 1998). 
 
Kim concludes that the resource curse manifests itself in human 
capital through two principal methods.  The first is that over-
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commitment to the low productive, low technology sector, including 
primary resources leads to a delay in raising the level of general 
capital66 which would make the economy more open and flexible.  
Secondly, in a similar fashion to Gylfason, Kim concludes that these 
“minerals economies have low levels of educational attainment” 
primarily due to their low technology sector67.  
 
3.2.1.2 Human capital as a basis for social capital 
When considering the previously used definition of social 
capital,68 it would appear that human capital (education) is a 
necessary pre-requisite to successively adopting more complex forms 
of institutions.  If the ultimate goal for social and human capital is to 
support the institutions required for economic growth in a market 
economy, and those institutions are guided and nurtured by a 
democratically elected government, then the following conclusions by 
Diamond (1992) are of note: 
 
1. There is a strong positive relationship between democracy 
and socioeconomic development. 
                                            
66
 Due to the immediate cost associated with developing general human capital. 
67
 In contradiction to Kim‟s conclusion, for an excellent paper detailing the level of technology employed 
by the mining sector see Wright and Czelusta (2003), who conclude that “minerals constitute a high-tech 
knowledge industry in many countries.” 
68
 Social capital was previously defined in this paper as the existence of a certain set of informal values 
or norms shared among members of a group that permit cooperation among them.  An alternative 
definition is: Social capital "refers to the collective value of all 'social networks' and the inclinations that 
arise from these networks to do things for each other" (Putnam, 1995).  As an aside to Putnam, social 
capital is a key component to building and maintaining a democracy. 
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2. This relationship is at least causal in one direction: Higher 
levels of socioeconomic development generate a 
significantly higher probability of democratic government. 
3. High levels of socioeconomic development are associated 
with not only the presence but the stability of democracy. 
4. The level of socioeconomic development is the most 
important variable in determining the chance of 
democracy.69 
5. The more well-to-do the people of a county, on average, 
the more likely they will favour, achieve, and maintain a 
democratic system for their country. 
 
Lipset (1960, cited in Diamond) hypothesised a number of 
historical and sociological processes by which economic 
development generated a greater likelihood of democracy.  Of these, 
the first is that economic development gives rise to a more 
“democratic political culture.”  This, he states is “partly due to 
increased education.  Citizens come to value democracy more and to 
manifest a more tolerant, moderate, restrained, and rational style with 
respect to politics and political opposition.”  An implication of this is 
that, given that institutions (and the society that supports and 
enforces their legitimacy) are an integral part of social capital, 
education has a key role in moulding and forming the social capital 
stock.   
                                            
69
 Diamond notes that this is however far from completely determinative. 
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4.0 DATA ANYLYSIS AND FINDINGS 
In order to better understand the resource curse and pay specific 
attention to its structure in African Countries as well as on the global 
scale, various simple regressions and correlations were run.   Data 
was collected which could give insights into economic performance, 
levels of mineral dependence, levels of institutional quality, and levels 
of human capital.  Since there is no direct measure for social capital, 
certain indices of institutional quality combined with a snapshot of 
current institutional arrangements (i.e. democracy) were used as 
proxies for social capital and its strength in support of these 
institutions. 
 
  The models used data from various sources including the World 
Bank‟s world development indices, export figures from the World 
Trade Organisation, measures of institutional quality from the World 
Bank‟s governance research indicator country snapshot dataset 
(GRICS), freedom and polity data from the United State‟s Freedom 
House surveys as well as various smaller organisations. 
 
Once collected and filtered to remove outliers, the data was then 
interrogated to provide answers to 5 principle questions: 
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1. Can the resource curse be confirmed? 
2. How does the presence of natural resources support 
economic growth? 
3. What is the role of institutions and institutional quality in 
mitigating the effects of the curse? 
4. What is the role of social capital in supporting those 
institutions? 
5. What is the hole of human capital in supporting both 
institutional quality and social capital? 
 
The following subsections attempt to provide answers to these 
questions. 
 
4.1 Confirming the resource curse  
The first objective of the data analysis is to confirm the resource 
curs.  Instead of including measures of natural resource intensity 
which includes agriculture, fishing and forestry (as per Sachs and 
Warner and many other economists which have studied the resource 
curse), this analysis is specifically focused on mineral resources 
including oil70.  As per Stijns (2001) it is assumed that mineral 
resources, as enclave or point-source economies, have structurally 
different impacts on the economy.  For one, due to the presence of 
large rents, mineral resources contribute to an economy principally in 
                                            
70
 This is principally what many economists inherently mean when they examine resource abundance in 
the context of the resource curse. 
  
Page 142 of 206 
the form of financial flows with a smaller influence on employment 
and linkages.  On the other hand, due to the widespread nature of 
agriculture, its primary impact on an economy is not through the 
distribution of rents but rather as an employer71 and secondly through 
its creation of various economic linkages. 
 
The following figures (figures 4-1 to 4-3) are produced in an 
attempt to confirm the work of Sachs and Warner (figures 4-4 & 4-5).   
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Figure 4-1 Resource dependence vs. economic growth 
Figure 4-1 depicts resource dependence versus economic 
growth.  As can be seen, although there is a slight decreasing trend 
in economic growth as resource dependency is intensified, the 
correlation is weak (R2 = 0.09).  Also noticeable is that poor countries 
                                            
71
 The World Bank (2005) estimates that 70% of Africans are employed (formally and informally) in the 
agricultural sector. 
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(such as China) which were not dependent on resource exports 
managed to achieve extremely high rates of growth.  The chart is 
further complicated by the case of Chile, which although dependant 
on natural resources for exports and foreign currency, achieved a 
growth rate of over 100% during the period of 1986 to 2002.  Chile‟s 
case indicates that resource dependent countries are capable of 
achieving high rates of growth; however Chile appears to be the 
outlier in the data represented above and thus must be seen in that 
context.  Given Chile‟s excellent performance over this timeframe, it 
should be studied in greater detail to determine which policies it 
adopted to enable such a high growth rate. 
 
Examining the data to determine if the resource curse is more 
present in the world‟s poorest countries and in African countries the 
following two charts (figures 4-2 to 4-3) indicate the same gentle 
downward trend as resource dependence increases. These charts 
greatly resemble the charts produced by Sachs and Warner (1997) 
(figures 4-4 and 4-5).  Sachs and Warner also show a weak 
correlation between resource dependence and economic growth – 
the foundation of the resource curse theses.  The correlation in this 
case is, however, unknown. 
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Resource dependence vs. Economic Growth
Poorest countries only (GDP per capital <5000 USD, 1995 terms)
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Figure 4-2 Resource dependence vs. economic growth (poorest 
countries only)
72
 
 
Resource dependence vs. Economic Growth
African countries only
y = -0.0037x + 0.1757
R
2
 = 0.0909
-100%
-50%
0%
50%
100%
150%
200%
250%
300%
- 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Fuels + Ores and Metals (% of total exports)
G
D
P
 P
e
r 
C
a
p
it
a
 (
1
9
9
5
 U
S
D
) 
G
ro
w
th
 (
1
9
8
6
-2
0
0
2
)
 
Figure 4-3 Resource dependence vs. economic growth (African countries 
only) 
  
                                            
72
 Economists typically characterise countries with a GDP per capital of less than 5000 USD as being 
underdeveloped. 
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Figure 4-4 Percentage of primary exports in total exports vs. economic 
growth (Sachs and Warner, 1997)
73
 
 
Figure 4-5 Percentage of primary exports in total exports vs. economic 
growth with country names (Sachs and Warner, 1997) 
 
                                            
73
 Correlation unknown. 
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Examining the charts of Sachs and Warner (1997) in detail, it is of 
benefit to highlight some of the differences between their data and 
the data used in this analysis.  In the Sachs and Warner dataset, the 
highest level of primary exports in relation to GNP is 54%, while in the 
case of figure 4-1, this figure is as high as 96% for the case of 
Angola.  It is also worth noting that in this study, GDP per capital is 
used a measure of economic growth while the % of natural resources 
in total exports is used to measure resource dependence whereas in 
the study of Sachs and Warner, they use total primary exports as a % 
of GNP to measure resource abundance. 
 
The following chart uses the same data as in figure 4-1, however 
upper and lower bounds to economic growth are superimposed. 
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Figure 4-6 Resource dependence vs. economic growth (with upper and lower 
bounds) 
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Although the correlations are weak, the data used in this report 
confirms the resource curse thesis.  That is, those countries most 
reliant on natural resources74, measured in terms of mineral exports 
to total merchandise exports have on average achieved less 
economic growth than those countries less reliant on natural resource 
exports.   For example, the average growth rate of countries with 
greater than 50% natural resource intensity in total exports was -5%, 
while the remaining countries with less than 50% intensity of natural 
resources in exports experienced 33%. 
 
At this junction, it is important to make the distinction that the 
term “resource abundant” is not appropriate when describing these 
“slow growth” countries but rather the analysis done to date better 
describes the effect of “resource dependence”.  Countries such as 
the United States, Australia, Canada and Norway can all be 
considered “resource abundant” due to the annual value of primary 
exports.  However, due to the diversification of their economies they 
are not “resource dependent.” The resource curse could rather be 
positioned in the following manner: Countries dependent on natural 
resources for growth achieve, on average, poorer growth rates than 
those countries less dependant on natural resources.  The data is 
                                            
74
 A natural resource in this case refers specifically to the metal ores and fuel component of natural 
resources.  Forestry and fishing are not included in the data. 
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however far from conclusive on this matter and as discussed later in 
this section, the poor performance of resource dependent countries is 
likely an outcome of other factors external to the quantum of natural 
resources in exports. 
 
4.2 Natural resources, „wealth‟ and the economic base 
The next set of charts examines the „wealth‟ of resource 
dependent economies.  It is important to examine this parameter 
since relative „wealth‟75 may act as an incentive for change.  For 
example if a country achieves a high level of wealth, while being 
natural resource dependent, there may be very little incentive to 
diversify the economy away from natural resources.  When examining 
the wealth of resource dependent nations, figures 4-7 and 4-8 
demonstrate that not only are countries that are more reliant on 
natural resources slower growers (as demonstrated in the previous 
section), but they are also characterised by low levels of development 
which is commensurate with low levels of wealth.   
                                            
75
 In this case wealth is measured in terms of GDP and GNI per capital whereas economic growth was 
previously measured in terms of GDP per capita growth. 
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Resource dependence vs. Wealth
All Countries
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Figure 4-7 Resource dependence vs. wealth (all countries) 
 
Resource dependence vs. Wealth
Poorest countries only (GDP per capita <5000USD , 1995 terms)
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Figure 4-8 Resource dependence vs. wealth (poorest countries only) 
 
The above two figures examined in conjunction with the following 
set of figures (4-9 and 4-10, gross national income (GNI) versus 
intensity of natural resources in total exports) indicates that in certain 
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cases, resource dependent nations can achieve relatively high levels 
of wealth.  It is also important to gain insight regarding if those 
countries that are achieving high levels of wealth, while also being 
heavily reliant on natural resources are also experiencing high levels 
of growth; i.e. are these countries breaking away from the resource 
curse by investing their wealth into high return activities?   Or, is the 
wealth from natural resources distracting government and postponing 
the implementation of policies which will deliver high growth rates? 
 
 
Figure 4-9 Resource dependence vs. national income (all countries) 
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Figure 4-10 Resource dependence vs. national income (poorest countries 
only) 
 
As can be seen from figure 4-10, when examining this subset of 
the world‟s poorest countries, wealth is very much evenly distributed 
between resource „rich‟ and resource „poor‟ countries.  Examining the 
sub-set to determine if wealth may delay growth, the same data is 
split into varying degrees of resource dependence and measured 
against economic growth (figure 4-11).  Countries were split into four 
categories based on GNI per capita.  Those with a GNI per capita of 
less than 450 USD, countries ranging between 450 and 1000 USD, 
countries ranging between 1000 and 2000 and finally those with a 
GNI per capita between 2000 and 5000.  The data was split such that 
an equal amount of countries fell within each category.  As can be 
seen, although economic growth of these „poorest‟ countries over the 
16 year period was approximately the same, there were very few of 
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the poorest countries (GNI per capita < 450) in the heavily resource 
dependent section of the graph.  Only one country, Iran, fell into this 
section of the chart, indicating that resource dependent countries 
enjoy relatively high levels of wealth (GNI per capita) when compared 
against the world‟s poorest economies.  Furthermore, the heavily 
resource dependent section of the chart (+50% component of natural 
resource in exports) did not achieve growth rates higher than those of 
the less dependent countries.  Figure 4-11, shows that real growth for 
these highly resource dependent countries over the 16 years 
examined was -5% while the growth rate for the resource poor 
countries was 33%. 
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Figure 4-11 Resource dependence vs. economic growth (split by levels of GNI 
per capita) 
 
It would appear that the analysis once again supports the 
literature review: resource rich countries enjoy higher levels of wealth 
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(measured in terms of GNI per capita) than resource poor countries 
(at least when limiting the sample to the developing world) and that 
this in-turn is linked to low levels of growth.  The mechanisms for this 
outcome are however not evident from the cross-country analysis and 
at this stage causality can only be a matter of speculation.  Further 
country analysis on a case by case basis would be required to 
support any conclusion that suggests that resource rich countries 
postpone the proper policies required for high growth rates due to 
relatively high levels of „comfort‟ afforded to them by their resource 
base. 
 
The data does however suggest, with relative certainty, that 
without their strong base of natural resources, the resource rich 
countries would have relatively low levels of income per capita, and 
low levels of GDP.  It has been touted in the literature that one 
possible solution for „breaking‟ the resource curse is for resource rich 
countries to turn a blind eye to their natural resources (i.e. leave them 
in the ground).  The data does not suggest that this would lead to a 
successful development strategy – rather, the analysis merely 
suggests that focusing solely on a strong base of natural resources is 
not likely to form the basis of a successful development strategy 
either.   
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Given the relatively high levels of GNI per capital experienced in 
natural resource intense economies, natural resources form a base 
for the economy and raise the livelihoods of people within the 
economy.  Therefore natural resources have a critical role to play in 
economic development since without them, many countries would 
lack the ability to attract FDI, much needed employment, 
infrastructure development and a source of foreign exchange – much 
of which is provided by natural resource development.  It must be 
recognised however, that these benefits are only temporary and, if 
not guarded against, can cause major disruption in an economy in the 
form of Dutch disease, corruption, rent-seeking and other 
unproductive activities.  Rather than adopting a myopic view to 
natural resource development, Governments should rather aim to 
diversify their economies away from their resource base by adopting 
policies that lead to industrialisation (not necessarily resource based 
industrialisation).  The natural resources should rather be considered 
as an endowment which is biding them time.  As the literature 
suggests, governments need to strategically identify sectors in which 
they wish to specialise and compete.  They must then in turn, nurture 
these sectors with appropriate industrial, fiscal and monetary policies.  
These „strategically identified‟ sectors may be developed from a 
strong natural resource base, or not.  The crux is the identification of 
those sectors based on a more robust and holistic analysis than 
simply turning domestically extracted minerals into various 
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beneficiated products.  Resource based industrialisation may initially 
seem to be the „easier‟ route but it is not necessarily the sustainable 
route.  As mentioned previously in this research report, an economy 
which is dependent on its natural resources is as finite as the 
resources themselves. 
 
 
4.3 The role of institutions in breaking the curse 
If natural resources are the economic base for resource 
dependant nations, then it is of prime importance to determine what 
factors ensure that natural resources are used towards delivering 
sustained real growth.76  As previously discussed, the presence of 
good institutions and proper governance can assist to prevent 
countries from falling into the trap of the resource curse.  In order to 
determine if there is a causal link between economic growth, 
institutional quality, governance and natural resource dependence, 
data was analysed from the Governance Research Indicator Country 
Snapshot (GRICS) dataset,77 the World Bank‟s Investment 
Attractiveness Survey and the World Bank‟s Development Indicators 
database.  Data was aggregated and presented for various levels of 
                                            
76
 This question is akin to determining what factors inhibit governments‟ distraction by natural resource 
wealth. 
77
 A complete list of indicators comprising the dataset can be found in Appendix A. 
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resource dependence78.    The separations chosen were 10%, 30% 
and 50% of natural resource exports to total exports.  The tabulated 
data can be seen in Figures 4-12 to 4-14. 
 countries with 
less than 10% 
nr in exp and -
ve growth 
 countries with 
less than 10% 
nr in exp and 
+ve growth 
 positively  
(green) or 
negatively (red) 
correlated 
 countries with 
greater than 
10% nr in exp 
and -ve growth 
 countries with 
greater than 
10% nr in exp 
and +ve growth 
 positively  
(green) or 
negatively (red) 
correlated 
1 GDP Per Capital (1995 USD) Growth (1986-2002) -0.21                 0.47                  -0.20                 0.32                  
2 WBO Investment Climate Average Score (unweighted) 22.27                24.27                 23.04                30.82                 
3 WBO Investment Climate - macroeconomic 44.58                35.31                38.03                53.66                 
4 WBO Investment Climate - governance 26.94                29.74                 25.89                35.07                 
5 WBO Investment Climate - infrastructure 9.57                  17.53                 10.93                12.74                 
6 WBO Investment Climate - red-tape 23.18                24.17                 24.05                32.09                 
7 WBO Investment Climate - perception of human capital 13.77                17.72                 13.61                19.90                 
8 World Bank_GRICS-(2002) Aggregate Score -3.10                 2.66                   -3.61                 0.85                   
9 World Bank_GRICS-(2002) Average Score -0.52                 0.44                   -0.60                 0.14                   
10 World Bank_GRICS-(2002) Voice and accountability -0.31                 0.50                   -0.59                 0.01                   
11 World Bank_GRICS-(2002) Political Stability -0.28                 0.40                   -0.57                 0.06                   
12 World Bank_GRICS-(2002) Government Effectiveness -0.74                 0.40                   -0.65                 0.20                   
13 World Bank_GRICS-(2002) Regulatory Quality -0.47                 0.45                   -0.55                 0.15                   
14 World Bank_GRICS-(2002) Rule of Law -0.67                 0.44                   -0.60                 0.15                   
15 World Bank_GRICS-(2002) Control of Corruption -0.62                 0.40                   -0.63                 0.18                   
16 World Bank_GRICS-(% change 1996-2002) Voice and accountability 0.36                  0.24                  0.74                  2.70                   
17 World Bank_GRICS-(% change 1996-2002) Political Stability 2.69                  2.01                  1.16                  -0.71                 
18 World Bank_GRICS-(% change 1996-2002) Government Effectiveness -2.11                 0.78                   0.87                  22.85                 
19 World Bank_GRICS-(% change 1996-2002)  Regulatory Quality -0.50                 0.40                   1.70                  -0.26                 
20 World Bank_GRICS-(% change 1996-2002) Rule of Law 0.89                  1.63                   0.37                  -0.69                 
21 World Bank_GRICS-(% change 1996-2002) Control of Corruption 0.37                  0.46                   0.39                  0.27                  
22 Fuel exports (% of merchandise exports) 0.63                  1.74                  27.44                26.48                
23 Ores and metals exports (% of merchandise exports) 1.58                  1.91                  20.56                11.02                
24 Fuels + Ores and Metals (% of merchandise exports) 2.21                  3.65                  48.00                37.50                 
Figure 4-12 Institutional quality and governance data categorised by +/- 
economic growth and natural resource intensity of exports <>10% 
 
 countries with 
less than 30% 
nr in exp and -
ve growth 
 countries with 
less than 30% 
nr in exp and 
+ve growth 
 positively  
(green) or 
negatively (red) 
correlated 
 countries with 
greater than 
30% nr in exp 
and -ve growth 
 countries with 
greater than 
30% nr in exp 
and +ve growth 
 positively  
(green) or 
negatively (red) 
correlated 
1 GDP Per Capital (1995 USD) Growth (1986-2002) -0.20                 0.43                  -0.20                 0.34                  
2 WBO Investment Climate Average Score (unweighted) 23.17                25.92                 22.60                28.15                 
3 WBO Investment Climate - macroeconomic 40.39                39.42                37.46                53.33                 
4 WBO Investment Climate - governance 27.64                30.84                 23.84                34.10                 
5 WBO Investment Climate - infrastructure 11.05                16.20                 10.18                15.71                 
6 WBO Investment Climate - red-tape 25.03                26.13                 22.29                26.41                 
7 WBO Investment Climate - perception of human capital 14.00                18.16                 13.18                20.60                 
8 World Bank_GRICS-(2002) Aggregate Score -3.16                 2.52                   -3.81                 -0.43                  
9 World Bank_GRICS-(2002) Average Score -0.53                 0.42                   -0.64                 -0.07                  
10 World Bank_GRICS-(2002) Voice and accountability -0.36                 0.45                   -0.70                 -0.29                  
11 World Bank_GRICS-(2002) Political Stability -0.39                 0.38                   -0.61                 -0.21                  
12 World Bank_GRICS-(2002) Government Effectiveness -0.69                 0.41                   -0.67                 -0.01                  
13 World Bank_GRICS-(2002) Regulatory Quality -0.49                 0.43                   -0.58                 -0.02                  
14 World Bank_GRICS-(2002) Rule of Law -0.63                 0.41                   -0.60                 -0.02                  
15 World Bank_GRICS-(2002) Control of Corruption -0.61                 0.39                   -0.65                 0.01                   
16 World Bank_GRICS-(% change 1996-2002) Voice and accountability 1.46                  0.12                  -0.24                 5.53                   
17 World Bank_GRICS-(% change 1996-2002) Political Stability 3.52                  1.05                  -0.40                 0.13                   
18 World Bank_GRICS-(% change 1996-2002) Government Effectiveness -0.03                 0.49                   0.29                  46.07                 
19 World Bank_GRICS-(% change 1996-2002)  Regulatory Quality 0.03                  0.25                   2.37                  -0.31                 
20 World Bank_GRICS-(% change 1996-2002) Rule of Law 0.87                  0.81                  0.12                  0.12                  
21 World Bank_GRICS-(% change 1996-2002) Control of Corruption 0.39                  0.23                  0.38                  1.01                   
22 Fuel exports (% of merchandise exports) 4.21                  3.33                  38.23                43.27                
23 Ores and metals exports (% of merchandise exports) 6.26                  3.36                  25.97                13.91                
24 Fuels + Ores and Metals (% of merchandise exports) 10.47                6.69                  64.20                57.18                 
Figure 4-13 Institutional quality and governance data categorised by +/- 
economic growth and natural resource intensity of exports <>30% 
 
                                            
78
 It is uncertain as to which level of natural resource dependency a country can be considered natural 
resource dependent.  A rule of thumb for describing a minerals economy was one which had over 10% 
of GDP owing to minerals development.  This rule does not simply correspond to 10% of minerals in 
exports. 
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 countries with 
less than 50% 
nr in exp and -
ve growth 
 countries with 
less than 50% 
nr in exp and 
+ve growth 
 positively  
(green) or 
negatively (red) 
correlated 
 countries with 
greater than 
50% nr in exp 
and -ve growth 
 countries with 
greater than 
50% nr in exp 
and +ve growth 
 positively  
(green) or 
negatively (red) 
correlated 
1 GDP Per Capital (1995 USD) Growth (1986-2002) -0.19                 0.43                  -0.22                 0.26                  
2 WBO Investment Climate Average Score (unweighted) 24.20                26.08                 20.34                no data
3 WBO Investment Climate - macroeconomic 42.77                40.38                30.58                no data
4 WBO Investment Climate - governance 30.00                31.07                 16.64                no data
5 WBO Investment Climate - infrastructure 10.68                16.16                 10.72                no data
6 WBO Investment Climate - red-tape 24.61                26.15                 22.59                no data
7 WBO Investment Climate - perception of human capital 13.43                18.32                 14.05                no data
8 World Bank_GRICS-(2002) Aggregate Score -2.67                 2.23                   -5.04                 -0.32                  
9 World Bank_GRICS-(2002) Average Score -0.45                 0.37                   -0.84                 -0.05                  
10 World Bank_GRICS-(2002) Voice and accountability -0.32                 0.38                   -0.92                 -0.24                  
11 World Bank_GRICS-(2002) Political Stability -0.35                 0.32                   -0.79                 -0.13                  
12 World Bank_GRICS-(2002) Government Effectiveness -0.57                 0.38                   -0.89                 -0.05                  
13 World Bank_GRICS-(2002) Regulatory Quality -0.37                 0.40                   -0.85                 -0.08                  
14 World Bank_GRICS-(2002) Rule of Law -0.54                 0.37                   -0.78                 0.02                   
15 World Bank_GRICS-(2002) Control of Corruption -0.54                 0.36                   -0.81                 -0.02                  
16 World Bank_GRICS-(% change 1996-2002) Voice and accountability 1.17                  0.17                  -0.39                 8.44                   
17 World Bank_GRICS-(% change 1996-2002) Political Stability 2.60                  1.00                  -0.51                 -0.12                  
18 World Bank_GRICS-(% change 1996-2002) Government Effectiveness 0.18                  1.26                   0.00                  69.85                 
19 World Bank_GRICS-(% change 1996-2002)  Regulatory Quality 1.40                  -0.11                 0.65                  1.94                   
20 World Bank_GRICS-(% change 1996-2002) Rule of Law 0.72                  0.74                   0.05                  0.15                   
21 World Bank_GRICS-(% change 1996-2002) Control of Corruption 0.36                  0.20                  0.44                  1.68                   
22 Fuel exports (% of merchandise exports) 6.29                  5.31                  50.96                58.00                
23 Ores and metals exports (% of merchandise exports) 11.11                4.50                  25.83                13.27                
24 Fuels + Ores and Metals (% of merchandise exports) 17.40                9.81                  76.78                71.27                 
Figure 4-14 Institutional quality and governance data categorised by +/- 
economic growth and natural resource intensity of exports <>50% 
 
Analysing the tables closely indicates that the negative effect of 
natural resource intensity on economic growth does not apply when 
controlling for governance and institutional quality.  In all cases, 
regardless of the intensity of natural resources, those countries that 
had higher economic growth also rated higher in terms of the GRICS 
survey (figures 4-12 to 4-14, rows 8 to 15).  This trend is consistent 
with the investment attractiveness survey (rows 2-7) with the 
exception of macroeconomic perceptions.79  
 
Closer analysis of the tables uncovers an interesting anomaly, 
when governance is controlled for, countries that had positive growth 
on average, had a higher content of fuel in their exports (row 22), 
                                            
79
 As has been suggested in the literature, macroeconomic policy was not the primary focus of a 
development plan for East Asia.  According to Chang,(2003c), “in East Asia, industrial upgrading, not 
macroeconomic stability (still less low inflation), was the overarching aim of economic policy.” 
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while countries that had negative growth had a higher concentration 
of mined products in their exports.  This anomaly is only noticeable 
when the resource intensity split is done at 30% and 50% (i.e. only in 
figures 4-13 and 4-14.).  This could suggest that fuel (oil) might be a 
better primer for economic growth.  This notion is difficult to intuitively 
accept since the oil industry is considered even more of an enclave 
industry than the mining sector – contributing large amounts of capital 
to the state in the form of rents, but contributing minimally in terms of 
economic linkages and employment.   However when considering the 
large barriers to entry in the oil and gas sector due to the costs of 
establishing refining capacity and the global distribution channels, the 
control of the reserves by warlords or other corrupt individuals can be 
considered less likely.  Furthermore, unlike gold, diamonds and other 
precious stones, fuel (oil) is a much less concentrated form of wealth.  
It cannot be easily transported to buy arms, nor can control of its 
industry be taken without attracting much global attention.  The data 
is however inconclusive and sector analysis would be required to 
determine the underlying causes of this anomaly. 
 
Examining the change in the governance scores over 1996 to 
2002 yields further interesting insights.  Those countries most 
dependent on natural resource exports are also positively correlated 
to „improvement‟ in institutional quality (rows 16 to 21) indicating that 
resource dependent nations, have in the last decade been spending 
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considerable effort in improving the quality of their institutions.  The 
impetus for these improvements may be due to increased awareness 
among developing countries to improve governance in order to 
achieve economic growth.  Alternatively, international assistance in 
the form of aid may have stipulated institutional reform and hence the 
improvements could be due to exogenous as opposed to 
endogenous factors. 
 
Figures 4-15 and 4-16 represent the absolute differences in 
GRICS and Investment Attractiveness Survey scores between those 
countries that achieved positive economic growth and those that 
experienced negative growth.  A positive score on the charts 
represents that an increase in a governance indicator is positively 
correlated to an increase in economic growth.   
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Figure 4-15 GRICS scores - absolute differences between countries that 
achieved +ve growth and those that achieved -ve growth 
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Figure 4-16 World Bank Investment Climate Survey - absolute differences 
between countries that achieved +ve growth and those that achieved -ve 
growth 
 
For all the indicators represented, countries that achieved 
positive economic growth correspondingly scored higher on the 
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governance indicators and in the World Bank‟s Investment 
attractiveness survey.  It would thus seem that institutional quality 
and governance are indeed a possible cure for the resource curse.    
 
4.4 Social capital‟s role to underpin institutional arrangements 
Although the previous section highlights the ability of institutions 
and good governance to break the curse, this does not necessarily 
mean that the adoption of democracy will ensure economic growth. 
Figures 4-17 and 4-18 highlight that a country‟s classification as a 
democracy is simply not enough to achieve economic development.  
A „procedural‟ democracy is categorised as a democracy if the 
current government came to power through the electoral process – it 
does not guarantee civil and political freedom, nor does it ensure that 
civil society has an active role in engaging decision makers as found 
in „functional‟ or „substantive‟ democracies.  In its tabulations, the 
GRICS dataset captures elements substantive democracy.  When 
examining the case of African democracies (figure 4-18), the majority 
of countries that achieved positive economic growth greater than 2% 
(real) per annum had positive GRICS scores, while the majority of 
poor and marginal performers had negative GRICS scores.  Due to 
the low GRICS scores achieved by African Countries, the data 
suggests that African countries still have several challenges ahead in 
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order to transform their procedural democracies into substantive 
democracies. 
Economic growth of 'democracies' vs. GRICS score
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Figure 4-17 Economic growth of 'democracies' vs. GRICS score 
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Figure 4-18 Economic growth of 'democracies' vs. GRICS score (African 
countries only) 
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Institutional arrangements are a form of social capital – however 
a distinction needs to be made between social capital and institutional 
arrangements.  One could argue that before institutions can become 
a part of social capital they must be internalised by the society.  They 
must become part of the culture and, in general, the majority of the 
citizenry need to tacitly understand the rules and procedures (both 
formal and informal) before one can consider the particular 
institutional arrangement as integrated into society.  Figures 4-17 and 
4-18 suggest that a lack of substantive democracies in Africa is due 
to a large gap between the social capital stock of Africa and its 
desired institutional outcome.   
 
African neo-patrimonialism under democracy is an excellent 
example of a mismatch between institutions and social capital.  In 
such a system, although the government comes to power through the 
electoral process, the leader is seldom openly and publicly 
challenged, the freedom of the press is usually limited or controlled, a 
system of patronage ensures the support of other national and local 
leaders, and furthermore under such a system it is not uncommon for 
tribalism to enter the political arena.   
 
Understanding the gap between the institutions and the social 
capital stock is of prime importance.  An analysis of the gap will 
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determine the type, shape and duration of transitional institutions – 
those crafted to close the gap.  The reason why democracies fail in 
the poorest African countries is not because democracy as a system 
is flawed – it is rather that in many African countries, society does not 
play the engaging role it should due to a lack of social capital.  
 
Society‟s role in democracy is primarily through enforcing the 
various checks and balances.  Society, which is informed by the 
press, is there to critically examine the decisions of the leaders and to 
challenge and openly debate the issues.  The west has had to step in 
to play this role with various multilateral and watchdog organisations 
such as the UN, the World Bank, Survival International, US Aid etc.  
Revenue transparency initiatives directed specifically at the minerals 
sectors such as „publish what you pay‟ are enacted because of 
society‟s failure to demand the same from its government.  In terms 
of the GRICS scoring system, the African subset of countries score 
an average of (-0.52) in terms of the category “Voice and 
Accountability”, while the average of the remaining countries is 0.29.   
When controlling to only examine „poor‟ countries (GDP per capita 
<5000 USD, 1995 terms), the African countries score (-0.54) while 
the remaining countries score (-0.09). 
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Distributing the data through a histogram (figure 4-19) assists to 
visualise how far back the African countries are in terms of this 
parameter.  As can be seen, African countries are on average doing 
worse than other countries. 
Voice and Accountability Distribution
Poorest countries only (GDP per capita <5000 USD, 1995 terms)
African Countries
Mean= (-0.54)
Median = (-0.54)
Mode = (-0.57)
s.d. = 0.70
Other Countries
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Median = (-0.05)
Mode = (-0.09)
s.d. = 0.78
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Figure 4-19 Comparison of voice and accountability measures between Africa 
and the rest of the World 
 
In determining if Africa is catching up, the following histogram 
(figure 4-20) shows the % improvement in voice & accountability over 
the period 1996 to 2002.  The data shows that African countries are 
not improving as much as other countries, although the lowest 
scoring African country is doing better than the lowest scoring „other‟ 
country. 
 
  
Page 166 of 206 
 Voice and Accountability 'Improvement' Distribution
Poorest countries only (GDP per capita <5000 USD, 1995 terms)
African Countries
Mean= 20%
Median = 20%
Mode = (-23%)
s.d. =108%
Other Countries
Mean = 43%
Median = 43%
Mode = (-0.09)
s.d. = 281%
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  GRICS Score Improvement - Voice and Accountability
 
 
Figure 4-20 Comparison of improvement in voice and accountability 
measures between Africa and the rest of the World 
 
 This shortfall in measures of voice and accountability, which can 
be considered a proxy for the role of society, is not likely due to placid 
support for the government and political leaders to do what they wish, 
but rather because of a general lack of „knowledge‟ as to the role 
which society should play.  Knowledge can however be gained and 
transferred through society via human capital accumulation. 
 
4.5 Human capital as a pre-requisite for institutions 
As customs, procedures, norms, informal and formal rules must 
be taught by some mechanism, before they are stored in social 
capital they must first be internalised in the human capital stock.  This 
section examines the role of human capital accumulation as a pre-
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requisite for institutions and also the various correlations between 
human capital and economic growth and development.  
 
The following set of figures set the context.  (Figures 4-21 to 4-
23)  It is of no great surprise that the „richer‟ or more developed 
countries achieve higher levels of human capital than poorer 
countries.  However one must determine the direction of causality – is 
it higher levels of human capital which allows for their level of 
development, or is it rather the level of development which allows for 
higher levels of human capital?  Evidence supports the conclusion 
that the direction of causality runs in both directions and can be seen 
to behave as a virtuous cycle.  Higher levels of physical human 
capital, allow for longer lives, which in turn allows for higher levels of 
intellectual human capital accumulation which manifests itself in the 
economy through better decision making and allocation of resources.  
This in turn allows for higher returns and a higher level of 
development and wealth.  Higher levels of wealth in turn, affords for 
better medical care and quality of education thus extending 
livelihoods, improving intellectual human capital and  decision making 
even further. 
 
Figures 4-21 to 4-23 show the relationship between wealth and 
human capital (physical and intellectual).  In this case, health 
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expenditure per capita and life expectancy are used as proxies for 
physical human capital, while literacy rates are used as a proxy for 
intellectual human capital. 
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Figure 4-21 Wealth vs. health expenditure per capita 
 
Wealth vs. life expectancy
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Figure 4-22 Wealth vs. life expectancy at birth 
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log GDP per capita vs. literacy
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Figure 4-23 Wealth vs. literacy 
 
When controlling the sample to determine if intellectual human 
capital (measured through literacy) plays a role in increasing wealth, 
Figure 4-24 demonstrates that wealth (GDP per capital) does exhibit 
a small shift to the right, indicating an increase in GDP per capita.  
The data is however poorly correlated against a positive change in 
literacy, concluding that literacy in itself is likely not a determinate of 
economic growth.  This outcome is however not surprising, since as 
is the case with natural capital (in the form of natural resources), it is 
not the quantum of human capital which is necessarily the 
determinate for economic performance, but rather it is how this 
capital is put to work.  The lack of direct correlation between human 
intellectual capital and economic growth could rather be a symptom 
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of a lack of a proper development plan or poor institutional quality 
which fails to channel the human capital into productive activities.  
More work would need to be done to ascertain the possible reasons 
for the lack of a more robust correlation. 
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Figure 4-24 Wealth vs. literacy (comparison between 1970 and 2000) 
 
Although human capital stock is not a driver of economic growth 
in itself, a broad base of human capital remains a necessary 
foundation for economic development since, as previously described, 
it is a prerequisite to enable economic agents to maximise utility and 
thus begin the virtuous cycle between human capital and economic 
growth.  Given this pre-requisite, it is then of interest to determine if 
wealthy and poor countries alike are investing equally in maintaining 
and building human capital stock.  Figures 4-25 and 4-26 analyse the 
effort placed on building human capital stock (measured through 
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expenditure per student) and participation by society in forming 
human capital (measured as % secondary enrollment). 
 
Figure 4-25 Wealth vs. expenditure per student 
 
 
Figure 4-26 Secondary enrollment vs. wealth 
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Figure 4-25 shows that in general poorer countries are spending 
more per capita on secondary education as a % of GDP, while figure 
4-26 indicates that wealthier countries are more able to participate in 
human capital accumulation activities as shown by secondary 
enrollment rates.  It seems as though there may be a contradiction, 
however upon closer inspection the following conclusion can be 
drawn.  The distortion or appearance of a contradiction may be in the 
measure of expenditure as a percentage of GDP.  There may be a 
point where additional expenditure as a percentage of GDP yields 
diminishing returns.  Given the large GDPs of the developed world, 
additional spend in this regard may be unwarranted – which gives the 
impression that poor countries are actually placing more effort in 
education than rich countries.  In absolute dollar terms, the opposite 
is more likely true. 
 
When examining the effect that resource dependence has on 
human capital accumulation (proxied through secondary enrollment), 
figure 4-27 demonstrates that secondary enrollment is no worse in 
resource dependent nations.  It also however illustrates that very few 
resource dependent states exhibit high levels of secondary 
enrollment.  This observation viewed in conjunction with figure 4-26 
allows one to conclude that although resource dependent states 
exhibit lower rates secondary enrollment, this is more likely a function 
of wealth than of resource dependency.   
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Figure 4-27 Resource dependence vs. secondary enrollment 
 
Although secondary enrollment appears to be more a function of 
wealth than of resource dependency, measuring the „effort‟ of 
government in building human capital (expenditure per student) 
against resource dependency (figure 4-28) shows that although 
resource dependent states are no worse than other states regarding 
expenditure on education, „on average‟, they spend less effort  in 
building human capital stock.  Recalling that resource dependent 
states have lower levels of wealth (figure 4-7) and viewing this in 
comparison with figure 4-25 which indicates that wealthier states 
spend less effort (as a % of GDP), one can rule out that the 
relationship in figure 4-28 is controlled by measures of wealth.  The 
conclusion to be drawn is that rather that resource dependant states 
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actually spend less effort on human capital accumulation (in terms of 
expenditure).   
 
Figure 4-28 Resource dependence vs. expenditure per student 
 
This confirms the findings of Gylfason (2001b) and disputes those 
of Davis (1995).  That is, resource dependent states invest less in 
intellectual human capital.  This may be due to the low levels of skills 
required in an undiversified minerals economy, thus governments 
postpone investing in higher levels of human capital.  Alternatively, as 
proposed by Kim (1998) the cost of accumulating more „general‟ 
human capital as opposed to „specialised‟ human capital prohibits 
governments from investing in general human capital which could 
allow for a more diversified economy and greater flexibility of 
economic agents. 
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When examining the pre-requisite of human capital and its role in 
supporting institutional quality and governance, figure 4-29 indicates 
a strong positive relationship between levels of intellectual capital and 
institutional quality. 
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Figure 4-29 Intellectual human capital vs. institutional quality 
 
This trend continues when aggregating various measures of 
human capital by using the World Bank‟s „human development index‟ 
(HDI) as can be seen in figure 4-30.  This data viewed in conjunction 
with figures 4-12 to 4-14, concludes that the development of human 
capital is strongly positively associated with economic development.  
Furthermore, since economic growth is achievable in resource 
dependent nations where institutional quality is controlled for80, and 
                                            
80
 As demonstrated in figures 4-12 to 4-14. 
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since human capital is a necessary prerequisite to „good‟ institutions 
in resource dependent states, it is therefore a prerequisite for growth 
in resource dependent states. 
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Figure 4-30 Aggregated human capital vs. Institutional quality 
 
4.6 Economic growth, institutional quality and human capital 
Figures 4-31 and 4-32 combine economic growth, institutional 
quality and human capital.  Figure 4-31 demonstrates a strong 
positive correlation between human capital and institutional quality.  
Furthermore, as institutional quality and human capital both increase 
the likelihood of experiencing negative growth decreases. 
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Secondary enrollment vs. GRICS 
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Figure 4-31 Economic growth, human capital and institutional quality (all 
countries) 
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Figure 4-32 Economic growth, human capital and institutional quality (African 
countries only) 
 
The results from figure 4-32 are more mixed.  Africa, in general 
has low levels of human capital in comparison with the rest of the 
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world and therefore the data is clustered towards the lower levers of 
human capital.  By extrapolating the growth lessons from the 
remainder of the world and applying these to Africa, it is reasonable 
to expect that if African countries raise their levels of human capital, 
they too could reduce the probabilities of experiencing negative 
economic growth. 
 
Figure 4-33 once again confirms the resource curse in Africa.  
The data is the same as in figure 4-32, except that a distinction has 
been made between resource dependant and non-dependent 
nations.  As can be seen, institutional quality is lower in resource 
dependent nations, while human capital accumulation is consistent 
with the remainder of Africa81, furthermore resource dependent 
African states achieved an average of -7% growth over the period of 
1986 to 2002, while non-resource dependent states achieved an 
average growth of 13%. 
                                            
81
 As discussed in sections 4.5, resource dependent states invest less in human capital (expenditure per 
student), however secondary enrollment may be the same as in non-resource dependent states.  Given 
the low levels of secondary enrollment in both sets of data, there is no evidence to draw any distinctions. 
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Figure 4-33 Economic growth, human capital and institutional quality (A 
comparison of resource dependency in African countries only) 
 
Examining the non-resource dependent states reveals some 
optimism for Africa.  Not only does the linear regression line yield a 
strong correlation to the data once resource dependent nations are 
excluded, but the slope of the line is steeper than the global average 
as depicted in figure 4-31 (slope = 0.19 vs. 0.15).  This indicates that 
given proper institutions and the avoidance of conflict,82 African 
countries have the potential to build institutional capacity quicker than 
the remainder of the world through investment in human capital (i.e. 
the returns to education in building institutional capacity are higher in 
Africa than in the rest of the world).  The improvement in institutional 
                                            
82
 Various incidents of conflict have plagued the resource dependent nations during the last few decades 
in countries such as the DRC, the Republic of Congo, Angola, Liberia and Sierra Leone.  It is worth 
noting that although Sierra Leone‟s conflicts have been fuelled by the illicit trade in diamonds, Sierra 
Leone‟s „official‟ exports of natural resource was calculated to be 22% - which grouped it into the non-
resource dependent category (figure 4-33).  Sierra Leone experienced -49% growth over the period of 
1986 to 2002. 
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quality and governance, as well as a robust stock of human capital, in 
turn would change the current economic outlook for Africa.  As the 
data suggests, such a paradigm shift from the status quo has the 
potential to propel Africa into a fast-growth economic trajectory.    
 
4.7 Geographic dimensions of economic growth and resource 
dependence in Africa 
Just as civil wars can spill over into adjacent countries, so may 
good practices.  In order to determine if an increase in economic and 
cultural exchanges, represented by geographic proximity has a role in 
promoting good and bad practices, a geographical analysis of the 
data was performed.  Figures 4-34 to 4-37 geographically represent 
African democracies & autocracies, institutional quality, human and 
economic growth.  As these parameters have been demonstrated to 
be a cure to the resource curse, the following figures demonstrate in 
which direction the cure is travelling.    
 
When viewing figure 4-34 in conjunction with figure 4-35, it is 
clear that the adoption of democracy is not necessarily 
commensurate with institutional quality.  In terms of the regional 
effect of democracy, it appears that democracy has a stronghold in 
the South of Africa.  Whilst there are many procedural democracies in 
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the East and West of Africa, there is no significant cluster effect to 
ensure their security. 
 
Figure 4-34 Geographical representation of „procedural‟ democracies and 
autocracies in Africa 
 
This risk is more evident when viewing figure 4-35.  The 
democracies in the West and East are characterised by poor 
institutional quality and governance in comparison to those in the 
South.  Given that institutional quality has been shown to be one of 
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the most important factors when determining economic growth from 
resource dependency, the East and West and especially Central 
African countries face the very real possibility of falling into the trap of 
the resource curse. 
 
Figure 4-35 Geographical representation of institutional quality in Africa 
(GRICS aggregate score, 2002) 
 
Figures 4-34 and 4-35 also demonstrate that Eastern and 
Western African countries are lacking much of the social capital stock 
required for functioning democracies.  This is based on the fact that 
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they have the correct „type‟ of institutions in place; however the social 
capital is not there to support their intended function manifesting itself 
in poor quality measurements. 
 
As social capital and human capital are inextricably linked, figure 
4-36 demonstrates that although all African countries are lacking in 
human capital (measured through the Human Development Index), 
only the Southern African countries (with the exception of Algeria) 
have levels of human capital high enough to build functioning social 
institutions.  
 
Algeria remains somewhat of an anomaly.  Given its democratic 
status (figure 4-34), as well as its relatively high levels of human 
capital (figure 4-36), the quality of its institutions remain poorer than 
would be expected (aggregate GRICS score of (-6.1); figure 4-35).  In 
the case of Namibia, South Africa and Botswana, these three indices 
appear to be mutually re-enforced.  This leads one to believe that, in 
Algeria, the high levels of human development experienced are 
primarily due to human „physical‟ capital as opposed to „intellectual‟ 
capital.  This would seem to be a plausible explanation, since it is 
intellectual capital (through education) which can affect social capital 
and hence the performance of a country‟s institutions.  In Algeria for 
example, secondary enrollment in 1975 was only 19%, by 
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comparison, Mauritius which achieved 100% growth over 1986 to 
2002 had a secondary enrollment rates of 38% and an aggregate 
GRICS score of 4.4.  
 
 
Figure 4-36 Geographical representation of human capital in Africa (Human 
development index, average 1975-2002) 
 
Examining the resultant economic growth (figure 4-37) yields 
some interesting insights.  Some countries, such as Sudan achieved 
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moderate growth whilst having poor institutions and low levels of 
human capital.  Sudan experienced growth of 61% over the period of 
1986 to 2002.  This was largely due to fuel exports which comprised 
32% of total exports.  Upon closer inspection, Sudan remains one of 
the poorest countries in Africa with an average GDP per capita of 260 
(USD, 1995 terms – 1986 to 2002) in comparison with South Africa‟s 
4000 USD, suggesting that Sudan‟s growth was heavily influenced by 
the fact that it was starting from a relatively small base.  Given the 
current conflict in Darfur, Sudan‟s mineral wealth appears to not have 
led to sustainable economic growth but has rather materialised itself 
into the resource curse.  The current high prices for oil and Sudan‟s 
lack of industrialisation leads one to believe that the resource curse in 
Sudan is most likely a result of Sudan‟s political economy and not 
„Dutch disease‟ or macro-economic instability leading to de-
industrialisation. 
 
By comparison, South Africa which scored relatively high on both 
human capital and institutional quality indices did not achieve 
significant economic growth.  Over the period of 1986 to 2002, South 
Africa only achieved moderate growth of 2%.  Controlling for the 1994 
general elections and the end of apartheid does not change this 
outcome.  In the period of 1994 to 2002, South Africa‟s growth was 
only 10%.   
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This analysis holds some important policy implications for South 
Africa‟s future.  Development objectives since the 1994 general 
elections have principally focused on addressing issues of inequality.  
Much time and effort have been spent by the government on 
addressing issues of wealth and land redistribution, which can be 
considered to be internally focused.  The government has not had a 
specific external or export led growth focus which would be geared at 
making the economy more competitive.  Given this analysis, it would 
appear that a more external focus, oriented on outward global 
competition may be required to channel South Africa‟s relatively high 
levels of social and human capital. 
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Figure 4-37 Geographical representation of economic growth in Africa (GDP 
per capita, 1986 - 2002) 
 
In considering the geographical distributions of economic 
performance, human capital and social capital, all of the above maps 
depict a similar pattern.  Countries with strength in institutional quality 
for example, tend to neighbour countries with slightly less positive 
scores.  The scores then tend to gradually diminish as the distance 
from the best performing countries increases.  This suggests that 
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increased economic and social interaction can have a positive role in 
spreading best practice.  It thus follows that increased regionalism in 
Africa through institutions such as the NEPAD, the AU and SADC can 
assist to build economic ties, and hence spread good practice.  
Furthermore, due to increased regionalism and interdependency, 
either through trade or through multilateral organisations such as the 
AU, countries may develop a greater ability to influence the policies of 
neighbouring countries.  Regionalism could have a positive effect in 
that the more intertwined two economies are, the more alternatives 
one has to put diplomatic pressure neighbouring countries when 
abuses occur.  Thus, increases in human capital and institutional 
quality may be catalysed through increased regionalism, which in turn 
can play a significant role in promoting peace and stability in Africa.  
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5.0 CONCLUSIONS 
The resource curse has been demonstrated to exist in this 
analysis through various regressions.  Resource dependent 
economies, on average have experienced less economic growth than 
those economies less dependent on natural resources.  Furthermore, 
resource dependent nations tend to have lower levels of wealth, 
lower levels of institutional quality, lower levels of physical human 
capital and invest less in intellectual human capital as a % of GDP.  
Natural resources have also however been shown to play a role in 
economic development as they currently underpin many developing 
economies in the world and especially in Africa.  It is for this reason 
that governments should not turn a blind eye to their natural 
resources.  Rather they must manage these resources wisely, as 
these resources are biding them time to develop a set of 
developmental policies to diversify their economies.  
 
Although somewhat controversial, as a first step, African 
countries should adopt democracy.  History has demonstrated that 
autocratic leadership can produce very high growth rates due to the 
autonomy of the state however, the data in this analysis has shown 
that Africa suffers from a shortage of benevolent dictators.  Rather 
than adopting harsh policies which will deliver long-term growth for 
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African countries, a great number of African dictators restrict civil and 
political liberties to secure power and pursue activities of self 
enrichment.   
 
It has been shown that institutions are capable of „breaking‟ the 
curse, however merely adopting democracy and importing institutions 
from the West are not enough.  Transitional institutions are required 
which will develop a deep „substantive‟ democracy through the 
current stock of social capital.  Human capital needs to be developed 
to change and mould the social capital stock such that it can be better 
aligned to the global economy.  Furthermore, human capital needs to 
be developed in order to increase the returns to economic decisions 
and facilitate the absorption of new technologies.  The investment in 
human capital should target „general‟ forms as opposed to „specific‟ 
forms of human capital.  This would reduce the future costs 
associated with the diversification of the economy.  With a higher 
level of general human capital, the flexibility of economic agents will 
be improved allowing the economy to diversify into higher return 
activities.  A wealth of natural resources wealth can assist in this 
objective as they provide rents which can then be re-invested toward 
this end. 
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There is no single correct formula to convert resource dependent 
economies, into diversified economies capable of sustainable 
economic growth.  However one actor which should be developed in 
order to carry out this task is the developmental state.  In determining 
the role of the developmental state, the government must make 
complete use of its economic and social development toolbox.  One 
such tool, which has received much recent attention, is the creation of 
a „good‟ institutional base.  The institutions will ensure that revenues 
and rents, obtained from a nation‟s pre-disposition and comparatively 
advantaged industries are spent in activities that generate social and 
public returns to the country as a whole.  Each form of institution: 
political, judicial, market, multilateral etc. will have its role to play in 
maximising the potential of the extractive industries and ensuring that 
wealth in natural resources does not detract leaders from the 
developmental objectives.  A customised, holistic approach is 
required to tackle the function and shape of the institutions, which in 
turn will lead to appropriate policy formulation.  Policies need to 
reflect the root of the problem, and sometimes deeply rooted 
economic conditions cannot be solved with a set of „best practice‟ 
policies, but will rather require a transitional strategy and hence 
transitional policies.  Wherever appropriate, policies and institutions 
should represent the underlying social fabric of a society.  Institutions 
will function more appropriately when modelled around a society‟s 
cultural norms and values.  Furthermore, as the NEPAD may 
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demonstrate, the customisation of institutions around African values 
will likely promote a deep sense of ownership of one‟s own destiny.  
 
Where the social capital does not allow for the proper checks and 
balances from civil society in a democracy, the international 
community may need to play a larger role.  Increased regionalism 
and interdependence of African economies should be encouraged.  
This will not only allow for the „spill over‟ of good practices, but will 
also give African leaders greater means to peacefully influence other 
faltering African nations.  Where African countries cannot effect 
appropriate change by themselves, the international community may 
need to involve itself through multilateral organisations such as the 
UN or through market based institutions.  One such example is the 
„publish what you pay‟ initiative.  Such arrangements ensure that the 
rents from resource extraction are not being siphoned off by the 
political elite.  Transparency initiatives also have the benefit of being 
easily linked to other market institutions such as stock exchange 
regulations.  Such initiatives are however only most effective where 
multinational corporations are the prime vehicle for resource 
extraction. 
 
From a minerals perspective, governments should effect proper 
institutions to smooth out resource booms to avoid „Dutch disease‟.  
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An example of such an institutional arrangement is the notion of 
revenue stabilisation funds.  These appear to have had success in 
the case of Norway and somewhat in Chile.  Where the value of 
natural resource exports raises the exchange rate to an 
uncompetitive level, monetary policies (perhaps in combination with a 
stabilisation mechanism) should be adopted to avoid rendering other 
domestic non-resource exports uncompetitive globally.   
    
In terms of developing a natural resource strategy, a country 
should not adopt a myopic strategy which solely seeks to maximise 
the net export value of the resource and provide employment through 
forced beneficiation.  There can be some temporary gains through 
this strategy, however as the case study of Chile has highlighted, the 
benefits are only temporary and the costs to the economy may 
outweigh the benefits.  A long term strategy to create a climate for 
economic growth includes: dispelling perceptions of political risk 
through increased governance and improving local productivity 
through the development of human capital.  Shifting the focus away 
from a short term politico economic gain towards a long-term vision of 
a globally integrated economy is the first and single most important 
step required along the developmental path. 
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6.0 FUTURE RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
From this initial research there are several additional outstanding 
research questions which should be addressed to better understand 
the effects of the resource curse and identify solutions. 
 
6.1 Detailed policy analysis 
In order to better understand the effects of the resource curse, 
why some countries have escaped the curse while other have failed 
an in-depth country analysis should be carried out.  A group of 
successes and failures should be considered with a specific focus on 
Africa, while gleaning lessons from the remainder of the world.  
Countries should include: Chile, Norway, Russia, China, South Africa, 
Botswana, Sierra Leone, Angola and the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo.    The analysis should spend time to understand the countries 
specific history, their current and past mineral and other policies as 
well as gaining insight into the country‟s specific economic 
performance.  These insights would then in turn assist to formulate 
specific country policy recommendations to (1) avoid the resource 
curse and (2) kick start economic development. 
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6.2 An integrated capital model 
There is a need for an integrated capital model.  Many of the 
regressions carried out in the resource curse focus on measures of 
GDP or GDP per capita to define economic growth.  The regressions 
should be carried out utilising a model which considers other forms of 
capital – natural, physical, financial, human and social.  The model 
should make use of „natural‟ accounts data.  For example, if wealth 
(financial capital) is generated through the development of natural 
resources, the increase in financial capital must then offset the 
reduction in natural capital.  The reduction in natural capital would be 
calculated as a reduction in the mineral wealth of the nation as well 
as a temporary disruption of the land in the form of environmental 
degradation.  The model must also include an improvement to 
physical capital (infrastructure, other man-made structures and 
technology), social capital and human capital (in the form of skills and 
skill transfers).  
 
6.3 Effect of a resource “super-cycle” 
Given the current elevated levels of global commodity prices, an 
analysis should be carried out to determine what measures can be 
implemented in the short-term to avoid the resource curse.  This 
analysis should first analyse current country economic data and the 
dependency of the economy on natural resources.  From there the 
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point of departure would be to determine the country‟s specific 
development objectives and the current levels of human and social 
capital.  An analysis of institutional and policy arrangements should 
then be analysed for effectiveness considering the levels of capacity 
of the government and the likelihood of integration into the current 
social and human capital stocks. 
 
6.4 Economic impact comparisons of oil and mining 
In this study, both mining and energy exports were bundled 
together in the regressions.  A separate analysis should consider if 
these two sectors have similar impacts on the host economy and the 
resource curse.  Specific focus should be paid to the various linkages 
provided, the level of corruption, the levels of political contestation, 
the barriers to entry, levels of employment created and the level of 
rents generated. 
 
6.5 Role of multinational corporations 
Given that in many developing countries, the multinational 
corporations involved in the resource sector are often the first form of 
formal economic activity present in remote areas.  Given this, what 
role do multinational corporations have in stimulating economic 
development?  Some of the topics to be considered should include 
the degree of employment generated, the disruption of cultural norms 
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(if any) and the minimal role of the state in providing services in these 
remote areas.  Should multinational corporations take up some of the 
administrative and service delivery aspects of the state in such 
areas?  Should multinational corporations actively re-adjust business 
models to proactively beneficiate in the developing world?  Such a 
discussion would likely be very subjective and in order to make the 
results more defendable, various surveys would need to be carried 
out in combination with an analysis of global trends. 
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Appendix A – Aggregate governance indicators dataset 
The following list of data sources comprises the World Bank‟s 
Governance Research Indicator Country Snapshot (GRICS) dataset. 
Source Name: Internet Address: Publication:
Business Environment Risk 
Intelligence
www.beri.com Business Risk Service
Business Environment Risk 
Intelligence
www.beri.com Quantitave Risk Measure in Foregin Lending
Columbia University www.columbia.edu/ State Capacity Project
Economist intelligence Unit www.eiu.com Country Risk Service
European Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development
www.ebrd.com Transition Report
Freedom House www.freedomhouse.org Nations in Transition
Freedom House www.freedomhouse.org Freedom in the World
Gallup International www.gallup-international.com Voice of the People Survey
Gallup International www.gallup-international.com Gallup Millenium / 50th Anniversary Survey
Heirtage Foundation / Wall Street 
Journal
www.heritage.org Economic Freedom Index
State Department / Amnesty 
International
http://www.state.gov/ Human Rights Report
Institute for Management 
Development
www.imd.ch World Competitiveness Yearbook
Latinobarometro www.latinobarometro.org/ Latinobarometro Surveys
Political Risk Services www.prsgroup.com International Country Risk Guide
PriceWaterhouseCoopers www.opacityindex.com/ Opacity Index
Reporters Without Borders www.rsf.org Press Freedom Index
Standard and Poor's 
DRI/McGraw-Hill
www.globalinsight.com Country Risk Review
World Bank www.worldbank.org Business Enterprise Environment Survey
World Bank www.worldbank.org Country Policy and Institutional Assessment
World Bank www.worldbank.org World business Environment Survey
World Economic Forum www.weforum.org Global Competitiveness Survey
World Markets Online www.worldmarketsanalysis.com World Markets Country Analysis
Please click on the "Country selection" tab More information on Governance issues is available at: www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/gov_data.htm
below to start using the governance dataset. 
80 developed and developing countries
186 developed and developing countries
111 developed and developing countries
27 transition economies
136 developing countries
80 developed and developing countries
35 developed and developing countries
138 developed and developing countries
115 developed and developing countries
26 transition economies
159 developed and developing countries
49 mainly developed countries
140 developed and developing countries
27 transition economies
192 developed and developing countries
17 Latin American countries
46  mostly developed countries
60/44  mostly developed countries
161 developed and developing countries
Aggregate Governance Indicators Dataset:
The composite governance indicators are based on data from selected variables provided by the following sources:
115 mostly developed countries
98 developed and developing countries
50 mostly developed countries
Coverage:
 
